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On April 30, 2007, Judge James C. Morfitt, without any detailed explanation, granted the 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of statute of limitations. Judge 
Morfitt indicated in his Order of that date that "Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action arising 
prior to July 21, 2003 are time-barred based upon the applicable statute of limitation for statutory 
violations." The issue at that time was whether a three-year statute of limitation pursuant to LC. 
§ 5-218 or a five-year statute oflimitation pursuant to LC.§ 5-216 applied. 
A Motion for Reconsideration can be brought pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B), which states 
in material part: "A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may 
be made at any time before the entry of final judgment .... " Rule 54(b) also allows the court to 
reconsider and to change a previous ruling. The material part of Rule 54(b) LR.C.P. reads in 
material part: "[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 
less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate 
the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties .... " 
In the two and one-half years since Judge Morfitt's Order of April 30, 2007, the parties to 
this action have been engaged in further discovery, multiple motion practice, an appeal to the 
Supreme Court and now they are now back before this honorable Court. During that period of 
time, it has become evident that the parties are proceeding upon a contract cause of action rather 
than a statutory action. 
The statute in question, i.e., LC.§ 72-915, does not by and of itself control the issue as to 
which statute of limitation should be applied in this context. True, LC. § 72-915 was the focus of 
the Supreme Court's decision entered in this matter on May 5, 2009. But, as developed below, 
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that is not dispositive of the applicability of a five-year statute oflimitation. 
Kelso & Irwin, P.A. vs. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000) has 
not been changed or overruled, or limited by any subsequent decisions of the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The operative language in Kelso is crystal clear: 
At 138. 
It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation insurance 
with the SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that contract would constitute a 
breach of contract by the SIF. Additionally, the contract necessarily incorporates 
the statutory framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that 
can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds ... consequently, any act 
taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority would also be a breach of the SIF's 
contract with Kelso. 
This holding immediately brings into play J.C. § 5-216, the five-year statute governing breach of 
contract claims. 
Paramount in this case is the fact that the smaller policyholders paying premiums of 
$2,500 or less have had their contracts breached by the SIF on multiple occasions. The decision 
by the Supreme Court on May 5, 2009 indicating the necessity of a pro rata distribution of a 
declared dividend corpus, once one has been established, leaves no doubt that the contracts of the 
policyholders within the Class have been breached by virtue of the SIF's statutory violations.1 
After Judge Morfitt's ruling, the Deposition of Randolph E. Farber, one of the individual 
Plaintiffs in this case, was taken by the Defendants. In that deposition, the State Insurance Fund 
refers to the contract between it and Mr. Farber (Farber Depo., p 18, I. 20; p. 27, I. 25). Th.ere the 
word "contract" is used by the SIF itself. Mr. Farber himself refers to his "policy'' which is, of 
course, a contract. The SIF does the same: 
1 It should be noted that while the term "dividends· has been used frequently in this case, the SIF has 
recently acknowledged that the operative statute really describes a rate readjustment. See, I.C. § 72-915. 
The readjustment of the cost of buying insurance is, in actuality, a readjustment of the consideration lying 
at the heart of the contract. 
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Q: Now, with respect to the insurance that you have with the State Insurance Fund, 
you don't even have a contract with the State Insurance Fund, other than your policy; correct? 
( emphasis added) 
Mr. Farber agrees with that statement. Id., p. 28, 1. 4. 
The Deposition of Scott Becker, another lead Plaintiff in this case, was taken on June 28, 
2007 by the State Insurance Fund. Again, this was after Judge Morfitt's decision. There, the 
policy of Mr. Becker with the SIF for worker's compensation insurance was discussed 
repeatedly. See, e.g., Becker Depo., p. 10, 11. 9, 12, 18; 12:7, 14. Mr. Becker purchased his State 
Insurance Fund policy because of the dividend distribution which made his contract with the 
State Insurance Fund "affordable." Id., p. 29, 11. 16-22; Mr. Becker, a layperson, refers to his 
contractual relationship with the SIF as an "insurance policy" Id, p. 32, 11. 13-14. The SIF kept 
interrogating Mr. Becker pointing out that his insurance policy with the State Insurance Fund 
does not say anything about dividends. See, e.g., Becker Depo., p. 45, 1. 19, p. 46, 1. 9. The SIF 
called the policy itself an "agreement" on p. 45. The SIF, in taking this position, clearly 
understands that the statute is incorporated into the contract and it is that contract which allows 
Mr. Becker a dividend under applicable circumstances. 
Following these two depositions and many pages of briefing, the Supreme Court on 
March 5th and May 5th made clear what was, perhaps, unclear to Judge Morfitt. That is to say, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Plaintiffs and the Class have a direct, contractual 
property interest in those dividend monies which were improperly distributed by the SIF. 
The conclusion that this is not a statutory cause of action but, rather, is grounded in 
contract is compelled by the fact that the Plaintiffs are pursuing the recovery of a property right 
which bears directly upon the consideration given for the purchase of insurance. Idaho 
employers do not fall under I.C. § 72-915 simply because they are employers. They must first 
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have a contract of worker's compensation insurance with the State Insurance Fund before I.C. § 
72-915 comes into play. When the statute is violated, as the Farber Court has said that it has 
been repeatedly violated, then that constitutes multiple breaches of contract. 1.C. § 5-216 then 
should control and allow a five-year limitation for the Class of policyholders which have brought 
this action on the basis of a deprivation of a direct, contractual property interest. 
The Plaintiffs in Kelso had made numerous claims regarding the conduct of the SIF, but 
were unsuccessful as to the bulk of those claims. On appeal, most of the district court's 
decisions dismissing the causes of action were affirmed. However, two breach of contract claims 
were remanded for further proceedings. There was no ruling by the Court as to whether these 
claims might be precluded by the statute of limitations but the fact remains that these claims were 
recognized by the Supreme Court as contractual, not statutory, claims. This is important because 
at least one of the claims which was remanded arose from the allegation that the SIF had 
breached its contract in failing to follow the duties imposed on it by I.C. § 72-911 - one of the 
statutes creating the SIF in 1917. These claims were regarded by the Supreme Court not as 
statutory claims but as contract claims as the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
Here, too, the contract claims of the Plaintiffs should be seen as paramount. The statute, 
standing alone, could not be utilized by the Plaintiffs unless they first had a contract of insurance 
with the SIF. That contract incorporates the statute, not vice versa. The dismissal of all of the 
Plaintiffs in the Class for the two-year period prior to the three-year period which Judge Morfitt 
accepted (but did not explain) was simply in error. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have requested the Court to revisit this issue under its inherent 
authority under Rule 54(b) and/or Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
The Defendants will argue that in some fashion Kelso has been changed or conditioned by 
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005). 
However, on close examination Hayden Lake will not support a determination that the claims 
made in this case are limited by the three-year statute. The facts underlying Hayden Lake are 
procedurally and chronologically complex since the complaint of Hayden Lake was filed while 
Kelso was still pending before the Supreme Court. However, one of the issues before the district 
court was whether a three-year or five-year statute of limitation should be applied against the 
Kelso and Hayden Lake claims against the State Insurance Fund arising from claimed violations 
of I.e. ff 72-911 and 42-722 (with the exception of an unjust enrichment claim which the district 
court held fell under the 4-year statute of limitations). The district court held that there was no 
actionable violation of I.C. § 72-911 and never reached the statute of limitation question. As to 
the claims arising from alleged violations of I.C. § 42-722, the district court looked to Dietrich v. 
Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 318, 154 P. 626, 628 (1916) which held that in determining 
the appropriate statute of limitation a "statutory liability . . . is one that depends for its existence 
on the enactment of the statute and not on the contract of the parties." The Hayden Lake district 
court indicated that the Dietrich holding should not be controlling in light of the Supreme 
Court's finding in Kelso some five years earlier. Nevertheless, the district court opined that the 
"gravamen" of the claim asserted in Kelso and Hayden Lake really related to the statute involved, 
i.e., I.C. § 42-722, rather than to any contract incorporating that statute. As summarized by the 
Supreme Court in Hayden Lake "Thus, since the claims would not exist 'but for' the statutes, the 
[ district] court applied the three-year statute of limitations to contract claims and determined that 
the claims accrued on the effective dates of the leases." at 395. 
In discussing the district court's decision on the question of what statute of limitation 
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applied to the alleged violations of I.C. ~ 42-722, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake upheld the 
district court in its finding that the gravamen of the Hayden Lake claims were grounded in 
statute. The Supreme Court in Hayden Lake then went on to state that the claims of breach of 
contract and implied covenant claims were based on alleged statutory violations and, as such, the 
application of the three-year statute was appropriate. "Though the district court recognized that 
Dietrich may not be controlling in light of this court's Kelso decision, it stated that "[Dietrich] is 
useful in support of the proposition that the true gravamen of the Plaintiffs' claims should control 
the question of which statute of limitations is applicable, rather than the manner in which the 
claims are actually pied." 
Kelso addressed two contract claims. The first claim argued that the surplus being 
retained by the SIF was in excess of what was statutorily required by I.C. § 72-911. 
A second contract claim had to do with allegedly selling worker's compensation 
insurance at the artificially low premiums established by I.C. § 41-1612(2) and (3). Hayden Lake 
discussed yet another claim that the SIF had entered into certain real estate leases which were a 
violation ofl.C. §§ 41-701, 72-902 and 72-912. Hayden Lake at 394; Kelso at 140. 
These claims were clearly tangential to any direct contractual relationship between the 
SIF and its policyholders as we have here. The Supreme Court in Kelso held that the 
policyholders of the SIF did not have a property interest in the assets of the SIF. Here, though, it 
has been clearly stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in its amended decision of May 5th that once 
the Manager of the SIF decides to declare a dividend and sets money aside for dividend purposes, 
then the policyholders do have direct stake in seeing that the distribution requirements of LC. § 
72-915 are carried out on a pro rata basis. The existence of a property interest distinguishes this 
case from Hayden Lake in that here there is a fundamental contracted duty to the policyholders 
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from the SIF by means of the statute which, once a dividend has been declared, locks in that duty 
to recognize a property interest in favor of the policyholders. This is not at all tangential and not 
at all abstract. The Hayden Lake and Kelso claims upon which the Court reached a Supreme 
Court determination had to do with the operation of the State Insurance Fund.2 The claims 
involved here are intimately and directly involved with the operation of a contract. That contract 
requires a pro rata distribution of dividend monies to identifiable and eligible policyholders. 
This is a distinction with a difference. If we need to find a "gravamen" it is the contractual 
property right arising from the contract to receive a pro rata share of the dividend corpus once 
that is declared and established by the SIF. Hayden Lake's holding is consistent with Plaintiffs' 
position if we must analyze this on an either/or basis between the statute and the contract as 
drivers of the appropriate statute of limitation. 
Coming back to Hayden Lake, therefore, one must pause as to the necessity of an 
identification of a single "gravamen" of this action. As previously stated, by the mere fact that 
one is an Idaho employer does not bestow any rights under J.C. § 72-915. Then, too, J.C. § 72-
915, standing by itself, confers no right to anyone. In truth, both the contract and the statute are 
necessary and are inextricably intertwined. One is meaningless without the other. The "true" 
gravamen in this case is that well in excess of 30,000 policyholders, more or less, have been 
consistently deprived of rate readjustment due them by virtue of their insurance contract with the 
State Insurance Fund. Whether the right to the receipt of these dividends is spelled out 
specifically in the contract or whether there is an incorporation ofl.C. § 72-915 into the contract 
2 None of the statutes conferred any direct right or benefit on the plaintiffs in Hayden Lake. I.C. § 72-911 
was concerned with the amount of surplus the SIF could or should set aside. I.C. § 41-1612(2) and (3) 
provided for the charging of premiums which the Plaintiffs argued were too low. The plaintiffs were also 
trying to condition or to direct the management or operation of the fund as to the amount of retained 
surplus required under I.C. § 72-911 and questioning certain real estate leases entered into by the SIF. 
These efforts by the Kelso and Hayden Lake plaintiffs were far different in scope and nature from the 
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would seem to make no difference whatsoever. 
Additionally, it is the law in this jurisdiction that where there is a choice between two 
statutes of limitation or a rule which impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, courts 
should generally prefer the construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the 
action. James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 710, 727 P.2d 1136 (1986). This holding is consistent 
with the holdings of many of our sister states. For example, in Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940 
P.2d 1096 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997), the Colorado Appellate Court stated "because statutes of 
limitation are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitation should 
prevail if two statutes are arguably applicable." at 1097. 
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court In Matter of Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43 
(Iowa, 1997), the Supreme Court of Iowa stated " ... Courts do not favor statutes of limitation. 
When two interpretations are possible, the preferred interpretation is one that allows the litigant 
seeking relief to have a longer period." at 45. The Supreme Court of Montana is accord. In 
Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Andersen, 983 P.2d 999 (1999), that Court stated at 1002 "[W]here 
doubt exists as to the theory of the action - and, therefore which statute of limitation should 
apply - the general rule is that the doubt is resolved in favor of the longer statute of limitation." 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota is in accord as well. In Global Financial Services, Inc. v. 
Duttenhefner, 575 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1998), the North Dakota Supreme Court stated ''we have a 
general policy of selecting the longer statute of limitation when there is a reasonable dispute over 
which statute applies." Citing Burr v. Ca/as, 564, N.W.2d 631 (1997). Similarly, in Zoss v. 
Schaefers, 598 N.W.2d 550 (S.D. 1999), the Supreme Court of South Dakota cited to Richards v. 
Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80, 85 (S.D. 1995): 
direct contractual property interest being asserted here. 
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. . . when one of two statutes of limitation may be applicable, such application 
should always be tested by the nature of the allegations in the complaint and if 
there is any doubt as to which statute applies, such doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the longer limitation. 
Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of the issues discussed above. Judge Morfitt 
apparently ignored the citation of the Plaintiffs to one case holding that a longer statute of 
limitation should be applied where there is a choice between a longer statute and a shorter statute. 
To be fair to Judge Morfitt, the Idaho case of James v. Buck, supra, was not cited or discussed by 
Plaintiffs in opposing the SIF's proposition that a three-year statute of limitation should apply. 
Then, too, the SIF only gave this statute of limitation issue short shrift in its Memorandum of 
February 13, 2007 supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment. That Motion covered many 
issues and the supporting Memorandum covered some 35 pages with only¾ of one page devoted 
to the statute of limitation issue. Thus, this issue was really not fleshed out for Judge Morfitt 
who, obviously, did not then have the benefit of the Supreme Court's controlling decision of May 
5, 2009. 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
If the Court does not agree that the Plaintiffs and their Class are seeking to enforce their 
direct, contractual, rights to funds in which they have a vested interest, then it is respectfully 
requested that the Court bifurcate the existing Class into two sub-classes as stated in the present 
alternative motion. These two sub-classes would be: 
Sub-Class # 1 - This Class would be composed of those employers who purchased a 
policy of insurance with the State Insurance Fund on or after July 1, 1999 and before July 1, 
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2001, who paid an annual premium for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than 
$2,500 for one or more policy years beginning on or after July 1, 1999 and before July 1, 2001, 
and who did not receive a dividend from the SIF relating to those two years. 
Sub-Class #2 - lbis Class would be composed of those employers who purchased a 
policy for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF on or after July 1, 2001, paid an annual 
premium for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than $2,500 for one or more policy 
years beginning on or after July 1, 2001, and did not receive a dividend since July 22, 2003 from 
the SIF during any respective subsequent year that dividends were paid to other policyholders. 
Such a bifurcation would allow Sub-Class #2 to proceed to a resolution whether by 
stipulation or Court decision and permit judgment to be issued as to Sub-Class #1. Sub-Class # 1 
can then proceed to appeal without delay while the damages due to Sub-Class #2 are sorted out 
and Sub-Class #2 will likely recover its claims before the appeal as to Sub-Class # 1 is resolved. 
lbis procedure is within the discretion of the Court and has the advantage of expediting a 
resolution of the claims of Sub-Class #2, as the composition of the Class is not in dispute. lbis 
results in no further delay in payment to the employers in Sub-Class #1 and a savings to the SIF 
since the interest accruing on the claims of Sub-Class #2 will cease as the claims are settled or 
decided. 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing demonstrates, there have been additional facts brought to bear in this 
case since the two and one-half year old decision of Judge Morfittt. Upon reflection and 
consideratio°' it is clear that the true gravamen in this case is the fact that policyholders have 
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been deprived of their contractually-derived property interest in declared dividend corpus. That 
fact, in turn, depends for relief on the yoking of the statute (LC. § 72-915) and the contract of 
insurance, neither of which can stand alone. 
Accordingly, this Court should, upon revisiting the issue, declare that the five-year statute 
of limitations should apply in this case which would be measured from the date of the filing of 
the Complaint on July 22, 2006. 
Alternatively, a bifurcation of the presently-identified Class into two Sub-Classes would 
be procedurally appropriate and would be in the interest of the economical administration of 
justice. 
1i"¢1.l ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _'"t_ day of~vembcr, 2009. 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By <llJL· 
Donald W. Lojek 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
ByL S~ (s(JI) ((__ 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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CERTfflCATE OF SERVICE 
LI1\! ~~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the___=i_ day ofN(P;em\Jer, 2009, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and 
addressed as follows: 
fx:.] (&and Deliveii) 
[_.] U.S. Mail, postage paid 
[ ] Overnight Express Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Copy: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
Donald W. Lojek 
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LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
F I A.k ~ 9.M. 
DEC O 4 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLEAK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, 
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER 
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their 
capacity as member of the Board of Directors 
of the State Insurance Fund 
Defendants. 
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t' ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
COMES NOW, DONALD W. LOJEK, and being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. That he is one of the attorneys representing the Plaintiffs and the class in the 
above-captioned matter. 
2. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the 
Deposition of Randolph E. Farber. 
3. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" 1s a true and correct copy of the 
Deposition of Scott Alan Becker. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this .,2 f"1ay of November, 2009. 
Donald W. Lojek 
1£ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t~q" d 
Notary Public or I a.ho 
Residing at: · {;7JS~ • 
My Commission Expires: =7j?;:i:;t-/.;:M7o 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD W. LOJEK - 2 
0001.80 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
L1 *f)P, £ ,Q.~ \»--
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_7_day ofvember, 2009, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and 
addressed as follows: 
[ xj and Delive 
~ U.S. Mai , postage paid 
[ ] Overnight Express Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Copy: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD W. LOJEK-3 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
Donald W. Lojek 
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IN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF THE TI-ilRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1 
OF TI-IE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COumY OF CANYON 
2 MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
3 GEDDES, MJLFORD TERRELL, JUDI ) 
) 
RANDOLPH E. FAR.BER, SOOTT Al.AN 
BECKER aoo CRJTIBR. CL.W!C, an 
Idaho Profes.s1onal Association, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) Ca.ie No. CV06-78n 
YS. 
TI-CE rDAHO ST A TE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and ) 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER. 
DEPOSmON OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER 
NNE29,2007 
REPORTED BY: 
MONICA M. ARCHULETA. CSR NO. 471 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
4 DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE ) 
5 MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in ) 
6 their capacity as members of the ) 
7 Board of Directors of the State ) 









4 TI-IE DEPOSITION OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER 
5 was taken on behalf of the Defendants at the 
6 offices of Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton., 
7 702 West Idaho, Suite 700, Boise, Idaho, 
8 commencing at 10:00 a.m. on Jwie 29, 2007, before 
I 9 Monica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Q 0 and Notary Public within and for the State of 
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1 APPEARANCES: 






LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
BY: MR. DONALD W. LOJEK 
1199 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1712 





GORDON LAW OFFICES 
BY: MR. PHILIP GORDON 
623 West Hays Street 
2 Boise, Idaho 83702 
3 
4 For the Defendants Idaho State Insurance Fund and 







HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
BY: MS. KEELY E. DUKE 
MR. RlCHARD E. HALL 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ALSO PRESENT: George Parham 
James M. Alcorn 
' j 
I 
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1 INDEX 
2 TESTIMONY OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER: 





7 1. Second Amended Notice of Deposition 8 
8 DucesTecwn 
9 2. Class Action Complaint and Demand 11 
0 for Jury Ttial 
1 3. First Amended Class Action Complaint 11 
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1 RANDOLPH E. FARBER, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 
3 said cause, testified as follows: 
4 
5 EXAMlNATION 
6 QUESTIONS BY MS. DUKE: 
7 Q. Good morning, Mr. Farber. My name is 
8 Keely Duke. We were just introduced off the 
9 record. I'm one of the attorneys who is 
O representing the defendants in an action that you 
1 have filed against them. 
2 If you could state your name for the 
3 record? 
4 A. Randolph Earl Farber. 
5 MS. DUKE: Counsel, ifwe can stipulate 
6 this deposition is being taken pursuant to the 
7 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8 MR. LOJEK: That's true. Before we 
9 start, Ms. Duke. Even though Mr. Farber is a 
O distinguished member of the Idaho State Bar he is 
1 not an expert in this case. And he won't be 
2 giving any legal opinions this morning. 
3 
4 
MS. DUKE: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you ever had your 
1 A. I may have. But I can't remember 
2 offhand. 
3 Q. Obviously, you're familiar with the 




Q. So I won't go through a lot of the 
7 ground rules with you. The big one I will go 
8 over with you is, if you don't understand a 
l 9 question that I ask you, please let me know. 
I 
}O Okay? 
}l A. Sure. 
l 
I t2 Q. And if you're answering my questions 
i J I'm assuming you are understanding them. Okay? 
I 
}4 A. Sure. 
I 
} 5 Q. If you could just give us a general 
I f 6 background of your education and what you did to 
! 
~ 7 become a lawyer? 
I 
i 8 A. I graduated from Willamette University 
I 
19 in 1974 with a B.S. in American studies and 
I 
2 O political science. I graduated with a J .D. from 
! 
i 1 Gonzaga University in 1977. And I became a 
2 2 member of the Idaho State Bar in September of 
2 3 1978. I then worked, I believe, for six years 
~ 4 with Bruce Robinson until 1983. I spent one 
; 
5 deposition taken before? 2 5 year, I believe, with Charles Coulter in Boise 
Page 5 6 
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D 
l from '83 to '84. And then beginning in 1984 
2 I shared an office space, sort of, with 
3 Frank Kibler until he died. And I have been a 
4 sole practitioner probably technically and 






Q. What is the address of your practice? 
A. 823 12th Avenue South. 
Q. And what is the name of your firm? 




Q. Do you have. any employees? 
A. I've got one full time. Two part time. 
4 And a couple of others for overloads and stuff 
5 when I'm lucky. 
6 Q. Has that been about the size of your 
7 ft.rm? 
8 A. No. At one time I had two full-time 
9 employees and two part time. Two or three. 
O Depending on who would show up. 
1 Q. And the full -time employee you have, is 




A. Paralegal; yes. 
Q. And then the two part times? 
A. One part time is basically a 
c. 
l receptionist/secretary. And the other one is a 
2 bookkeeper. And, like I say, I have a couple 
3 contractual people ifl have a reaJ emergency or 
4 an overload . 
5 Q. And it sounds like you obtained your 




Q. Since that time have you had any times 
9 when it has been revoked, suspended, anyth.ing 




Q. With respect to Exhibit No. 1, wh.ich 
3 you have in front of you. That is your notice of 




Q. -- asking that you bring with you 




Q. Do you have any docwnents that would be 









Q. Have you provided any documents to your 
t 3
4 
attorneys with respect to your claims in this 
1 case or any issue with respect to your policy for 
2 5 Workers' Compensation insurance with the State 
I 
I 
Page 7 I Page 8 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000185 
4 (Pages 7 to 8) 
1 Insurance Fund? 
2 MR. LOJEK: We would object to that 
3 question insofar as it attempts to invade the 
4 attorney-client priviJege with respect to 
5 privileged communicatioos. 
6 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Did you have in your 
7 possession any documents that you feel relate to 





A. My private possession? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Prior to hiring attorneys did you have 
3 documents that were in your possession that 




A. Not what I would call as a document. 
Q. So nothing in writing? 
A. Other than perhaps the check I write 
8 every year to the State Industrial Fund. They 
9 send me a couple documents. And I assume that 






not generate any docwnents myself. 
Q. But even with respect to documents that 
the State Insurance Fund may have produced, did 
you have any of those documents prior to hiring 
an attorney related to your policies? 
Page 
1 A. I don't know. I just write the check. 
2 And once in a while my secretary may fill out 
3 something. But I don't even know where those 
4 documents are. 
5 MS. DUKE: And given your objection, 
6 I obviously don1t want to invade the 
7 attorney-client privilege. But we would expect 
8 to see a privilege log with any documentation 
9 that has been provided providing a description 
O that is required under the Idaho Rules of Civil 
1 Procedure so we can see at least what documents 
2 are out there and what you are claiming a 
3 privilege to, if there are any. 
4 ~ LOJEK: That's fine. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What did you do to 






A. Talk to my attorneys. 
Q. And when did you talk to them? 
A. I have talked to them several times. 
Q. In preparation for your deposition. 
A. Today and yesterday. 
Q. And how long did you meet with them? 
A. Approximately an hour each time. 
Q. Did you review any documents in 
preparation for your deposition today? 
Page 10 
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A. Yes. 1 
2 Q. And what documents did you review in 
3 preparation? 
4 A. 1 reviewed the first and second amended 
5 complaint. I also reviewed -- and by "review" I 
6 should use the word "skimmed." Mr. Alcom's 
7 affidavit I even took a look at some 
8 interrogatory answers. But, once again, Ijust 
9 skimmed over those. 
0 Q. Any other documents that you looked at 
1 in preparation for your deposition? 
A. Well, this subpoena. 
Q. Any others? 




5 MR. LOJEK: By "subpoena" you meant the 
6 notice of deposition? 
7 THE WITNESS: Right. 
8 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Now, You mentioned the 
9 first and second amended complaints. I would 
O assume that you actually mean the Class Action 
1 Complaint, which is Exhibit 2. And then the 
2 First Amended Complaint, which is Exhibit 3? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. I just wanted to make sure I was clear 
5 on that. Because I'm not aware of a second 
Page 
1 amended complaint. Prior to reading the 
2 complaint, which is Exhibit 2, and the amended 
3 complaint, which is Exhibit 3, had you read 
4 those, prior to that time of reading them, in 
5 preparation for your deposition? 
6 A. r had reviewed the first complaint. 
7 And, once again, I would qualify that by saying I 
8 skimmed over it. 
9 Q. And did you review the first complaint 
O prior to the time it was filed? 
1 
2 
A. I can't recall. 
Q. And so the first time you would have 
3 read the First Amended Complaint, Exhibit 3, 





A. Yesterday. Among my attorneys. 
Q. Have you spoken to anyone other than 
8 your attorneys with respect to your claims in 
9 this case? 
A. No. 
Q. And so I would assume with respect to 
that answer you have not spoken to any other 




6 (Pages 11 to 12) 











Q. Do you know who Scott Becker is? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever met him? 
A. No. 
Q. Ever talked to him? 
A. No. 







Q. Never talked to anybody there? 
A. No. 
Q. How did you come about to bring this 
4 case? 
5 A. I would object to that. I believe it 
6 involves privileged communications. 
7 Q. rm only seeking, prior to you 
8 obtaining an attorney, what led you to bring this 
9 case or to seek counsel? 
O A. I believe, once again, that is 
1 privileged. I was certainly aware of the fact 
2 that I was no longer getting a dividend. 
3 Q. I understand. But you have attorneys 
4 here today. And, as I understand it, you already 




Q. And so unless your attorneys is 
J instructing you not to answer or you are refusing 
4 to answer --
5 A. I think my attorneys are instructing me 
6 not to discuss privjleged communications. 





Q. If you can let me finish, please. What 
1 I'm looking for is, I would like to know what led 
2 you to bring th.is action prior to being in 
3 contact with your attorneys. So there would be 
4 no attorney-client privilege. 
5 MR. LOJEK: And I'm going to object at 
6 this point, because I think what Mr. Farber is 
7 saying is the contact with the attorneys are 
8 intertwined with his decision to bring this 
9 action. He was aware of the fact that he was not 











the privileges attaches and you are not required 
to invade that privilege. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How were you first 
contacted with regard to this case? 
Page 13 / 
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1 Iv1R. LOJEK: And to the extent that 
2 would invade the attorney-client privilege I 
3 would instruct you not to answer. 
4 THE WITNESS: And I'll rely upon my 
5 attorney for the answer to that question. 
6 
7 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So did ·-
MR. LOJEK: And, also, it assumes facts 
8 not in evidence. And that would be part of my 
9 objection. 
0 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Did you make contact 
1 with your attorneys first or did they make 
2 contact with you first with respect to this case? 
3 MR. LOJEK: I think that is within the 
4 anomey-client privilege. Which, as I 
5 understand it, having researched this briefly, 
6 anticipating this would come up, once there is 
7 any decision to contact an attorney, and the 








privilege attaches to all of those contents and 
all of those conversations, regardless of who 
initiated it. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So with respect to the 
number of times here that your counsel has 
instructed you not to answer, you're following 






(Discussion held off the record.) 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Mr. Hall and I have been 
4 counseling here. With respect to the objections 
5 made, the fact of an actual contact with an 
6 attorney is not privileged. Maybe the content of 
7 it could be privileged. Depending on whether or 
8 not an attorney-client relationship existed. But 
9 obviously this is the position you are taking 
O today. And we'll seek a ruling from the court. 
1 And seek our fees and costs related to that. 
2 MR. LOJEK: I would hope you wouJdn't 
3 have to do that, because J still even think it is 
4 within the scope of Rule 26. And I think it is a 
5 non-issue. But let's move on. 
6 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How long have you had 
7 Workers' Compensation insurance with the State 
8 Insurance Fund? 
9 A. Probably since - somewhere in the 
period of '83 to '85. When I first went to work 
J didn't have any employees. I may have hired --
r remember hiring a pan-time person about that 
period of time. And then I got a full-time 
person. And then after Mr. Kibler died I believe 
J also adopted his secretary. So whatever was 
Page 16 
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l happening there. 
2 Q. And what led you to obtain your 
3 Workers' Compensation insurance with the State 
4 Insurance Fund? 
s A. I had to do it. T have to have 
1 insurance with the State Insurance Fund since 
2 that time that you obtained it back in '83 or 
3 '85? 
4 A. Between '83 and '85, to the best of my 
5 knowledge; yes. 
6 Workmen's Compensation insurance in order to have 6 Q. And, as I understand it, over the 
7 employees. If I don't, it is a criminal offense. 
8 Q. I understand. But you certainly know 
9 that there is many companies out there that offer 
O Workers' Compensation insurance --
1 
2 
A. I don't know ifl knew it at that time. 
Q. Okay. Well, what I'm asking for is, 
3 was your reason just that you only knew about the 
4 State Insurance Fund, so that is why you went to 
5 them? 
6 A. Probably. 
7 Q. Well, was that the case? 
8 A. You're asking me about why I did 
9 something over 20 years ago. And I probably just 
0 knew that I had to have the insurance. And I 
1 certainly don't have any distinct memory of 
2 shopping around. I knew that I had to sign up 
3 for it. And I did it. 
4 Q. And have you kept your insurance 
5 coverage with respect to Workers' Compensation 
7 course of your time with the State Insurance 
8 Fund, you have had difficulty some years paying 
9 your premiums on time? 
0 
1 
A. That could be; yes. 
Q. And you have had difficulties reporting 
2 your payroll to the State Insurance Fund a number 
3 oftimes? 




staff when I have lots of staff members. But, 
yes, I'm the captain of the srup. So, you bet, -
t 
7: at times that has occurred. 
Q. And as a result there have been times 






potential rescission of your contract for failure 
to follow policy requirements? 
2 2 A. That is certainly possible; yeah. 
i 
I 
T 3 Q. With respect to the insurance that you 
i 




2 5 have your premiums been over the course of --
Page 17 i Page 18 
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1 let's just pick like the last six years? And 
2 just an estimate. I understand you might not 
3 have that exact figure. 
4 A. Oh, probably somewhere $3- to $500. 
S Maybe W1der. I don't know. 
6 
7 
Q. Do you know what they are this year? 
A. I don't have any distinct recollection. 
8 They base it on my payroll. 
9 MR LOJEK: I think as the 
0 representative of the State Insurance Fund she 
1 has this information already. But she's testing 
2 your memory. So if you don't know,just say you 
3 don't know. 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And with respect to 
6 dividends. First of all, what do you understand 
7 a dividend to be? 
8 A. Well, from my understanding, as it is 
9 used in the context of this action, they t.ake the 
O premiums of a class, compare it to the losses, 
1 figure out their administrative figure. And if 
2 the specific class takes in more money, then they 
3 declare a dividend. That's my understanding. 
4 Q. Any other understanding of what the 
i 
1 Or do you feel that is an adequate description of 
2 your understanding? 
3 A. I'm sure it is not adequate 
4 description. But it is my working knowledge of 
5 what it is. I'm not an expert on State Insurance 
6 Fund. 
7 Q. Who handles the Workers' Compensation 
8 matters at your office? From the standpoint if 
9 you have any paperwork to file with the State 
0 Insw-ance Fund, who does that at your office? 
1 A. Whoever is my lead paralegal at the 
2 time. 
Q. Who is currently doing that for you? 
A. Anna Cardosa. 
Q. But I would assume anything you submit 
to the State Insurance Fund you read through and 
have an opportunity to correct, if necessary'? 
A. l rely upon Anna. But, yes, I do sign 
Q. With respect to dividends. What is 
your understanding as to who detennines whether 
2 2 or not a dividend will be provided? 
I 
t 3 A. Well, I believe the State Industrial 
I 
t 4 Commission. And I suppose their director. 
I 
5 State Insurance Fund dividend is other than that? 2 5 Mr. Alcorn makes recommendations as to that. I 
Page 19 : Page 20 
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1 was unaware of the fact until this morning that 
2 there is actually a board involved. 
3 Q. So even though you read the complaint, 
4 Exhibit No. 2, and the board members are listed 
5 as defendants, you had no idea there was a board 
6 until today? 
7 A. I didn't know what role the board 
8 played. 
9 Q. What do you understand the role of the 
o board to be? 





A. I am aware of the statute. And I have 
j 2 read the statute. 
I 
I 
13 Q. Have you read the statute independent 
j 
4 from this case? Meaning, not related to this 
I 5 case. 
16 A. No. 
7 Q. And when you say "the statute," what 
8 statute are you referring to? 
19 A. The one that refers to dividends. And 
i 




he makes recommendations. And then they agree or t 
3
2 
disagree on them. t 
Q. And just to make sure we are talking 
about the same thing. I would asswne what you 
are referencing is Idaho Code Section 72-915? 
4 
5 on? 
Q. And what do you base that understanding t: A. Yes. 
Q. Have you read any of the other State 
Insurance Fund statutes contained within Title 72 6 A. I read some minutes. 1 skimmed over 
7 some minutes. 
8 Q. And that was in preparation for today's 
9 deposition? 
0 A. Yes. 
1 
2 
Q. Do you recall what minutes you read? 
A. Oh, the last several years. I don't 
3 know the exact years. 
4 Q. Any other basis for your understanding 
5 related to the role of the board? 
i 
}6 
1 7 of the Workers' Compensation code? 
I 
la A. No. 
19 
! 
Q. So 72-915 would be the depth of your 




~ 1 to the State Insurance Fund? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. What else? 
A. Once again, I think you are getting 
? 5 into some privileged communication between my 
i 
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1 attorneys and mysel( 
2 Q. Well, I don't want to do that. I only 
3 want to get into what you personally know. Not 
4 through your attorneys or through your own 
5 reading. So other than Idaho Code Section 
6 72-915, do you have any other infonnation related 
7 to Title 72 of the Idaho Code? 
8 'MR. LOJEK: And I'll object to the last 
9 question or statement, whichever it was. Because 
O once he receives information from his attorneys, 
l then he does have personal knowledge of iL But 
2 that is also an attorney-client communication. 
3 So I think what your question respectfully is, do 
4 you have any infonnation independent of what your 
5 attorneys have told you? 
MS. Dl}KE: Right. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you? 
6 
7 
8 MR LOJEK: Outside of what we have 
9 told you about the case, and what we have 
O discussed, she wants to know if you have any 
1 additional information? 
2 1HE WITNESS: The only additional 
3 information that I have is that at one time I was 
4 getting dividends and they were applied as a 
5 credit towards my policy. And then for some 
Page 23 
1 reason I stopped getting premiums. 
2 
3 
MR. LOJEK: Dividends? 
THE WITNESS: Dividends, I should say. 
4 Refunds. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Other than that, and 
6 your testimony related to Idaho Code Section 
7 72-915, and, of course, independent from what 
8 your attorneys may have told you, do you have any 
9 other knowledge with respect to the Idaho Code as 
O it relates to the State Insurance Fund? 




review some minutes of some meetings. And I 
believe there is an affidavit of Mr. Alcorn. And 
t: it may have made a reference to a letter or two. And so they made references to the Idaho Code. 
6 But other than that, anything else would be -- I . 
7 believe is covered by privileged communication 
8 between myself and my attorneys. 
9 Q. Have you ever sustained any losses with 





A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Meaning, a report by an employee being 
¥ 3 harmed and. therefore, needing your Workers' 
~4 Compensation insurance to go into effect? 
1s A Not that I'm aware of. 
Page 24 
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Q. What years did you receive dividends? 
A. Oh, I think probably in the '80s or 
3 '90s. 
4 Q. Do you know when you stopped receiving 
5 a dividend? 
6 A. II would probably be around •• since 
7 I've reviewed the minutes of the state board it 
8 appears to be around 2000, 200 l. 
9 Q. And that was from a review that you did 
0 yesterday; correct? 
1 
2 
A. No. This morning. 
Q. So prior to this morning did you have 
3 an understanding as to when you stopped receiving 
4 dividends? 
5 A. Well, I knew it had been the last 
6 several years. 
7 Q. But did you have an understanding as to 
8 whatyear? 
9 A. I did not have an exact idea. I just 
O knew the last several years that I have not been 
1 getting a dividend. And I got a letter saying, 
2 "You don't have a dividend this year." 
3 Q. What were the approximate value of the 
4 dividends you would receive? 
5 A. I don't have any independent 
1 recollection of that. 
2 Q. Do you have any estimate? Whether it 
3 was a couple hundred dollars? Ten dollars? 
I 4 A. You mean my refund? 
5 
6 
Q. Yes. Dividend. 
A. I'm sorry. No, it certainly wasn't 
7 several hundred dollars. It was probably-- I'm 
8 guessing. But it was probably .. 
9 MR. LOJEK: Please don't guess. 




THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
!viR. LOJEK: And she is just trying to 
· 4 test your memory, I think. 
5 TIIE WITNESS: I don't haye an 
[ 6 independent recollection. 
7 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have any estimate 
8 with respect to what your dividends were? 
9 MR. LOJEK: I'll objecL Because you 
I O are asking for speculation. He has told you he 












A. I would be speculating. I just don't 
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Q. What is your understanding as to when a 
dividend is disoibuted to policyholders? 
A. Well, it is my understanding it is 
distributed annually. 
Q. And when annually? 
A. I don't know. I have a faint memory 
that it is usually done in the summer. Or 
perhaps that is when it is due. 
Q. When what is due? 
A. My premium. 
MR. LOJEK: Your dividend? 
TIIE WITNESS: No. 
MR. LOJEK: rm sorry. fll be quiet. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have an 
understanding of what a deviation is? 
A. No. 
Q. And so I would assume by that answer 
8 you have no idea whether your policy receives a 
9 deviation? 
0 A. No. 
1 Q. Correct? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. Now, with respect to the insurance that 
4 you have with the State Insurance Fund. You 
5 don't have a contract with the State Insurance 
1 Fund, other than your policy; correct? 
2 A. To the best of my knowledge; yes. 
3 Q. That's correct? 
4 A. I agree with your statement. 
5 Q. And does your pol icy say anything about 
6 dividends in it? 
7 A. I don't know. 
8 Q. Is it your allegation that the State 
9 Insurance Fund has to provide a dividend? 
0 A. From my reading of the statute -- could 
1 I look --
2 MR. LOJEK: And .before you answer the 
3 question. He's not offering this as a legal 
4 opinion. But only as a lay opinion. 
5 THE WJTNESS: May I look at the 
6 - statute? 
l 7 MS. DUKE: Sure. 
i 
8 THE WJTNESS: It says here, "At the end 
9 of every year, and at such other times as the 
O manager in his discretion may determine, a 
1 readjustment of the rate shall be made for each 
2 of the several classes of employment. If at any 
2 3 time there is an aggregate balance remaining to 
14 
I 
the credit of any class of employment or industry 
1s 
I 
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1 properly divided, he may in his discretion, 
2 credit to each individual member of such class 
3 who shall have been a subscriber to the State 
4 Insurance Fund for a period of six months or 
S more, prior to the time of such readjustment, 
6 such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
7 entitled to, having regard to his prior paid 
8 premiwns since the last readjustment of rates." 
9 So if you are in a class, which I 
0 apparently am in, which there is an aggregate 
1 balance remaining to the credit of that class, 
2 then, to my mind, taking in other factors, there 
3 should be a distribution. And in the past there 
4 was a distribution. 
5 Q. So my question was whether or not it is 
6 your position in this case that the manager has 
7 to provide a dividend to the policyholders? 
8 A. He has to if certain preexisting 
9 conditions are met and set out in the statute. 
0 Q. And what are those preexisting 
1 conditions, as you understand them? 
2 A. Well, all I can do is refer to the 
3 language of the statute. Which refers, "There is 
4 an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of 
5 any class of employment or industry." So I 
Page 
1 assume that that is a surplus of premiums over 
2 losses and administrative expenses or however 
3 else they do it. 
4 Q. Any other preexisting conditions that 
5 must occur, as you understand it? 
6 
7 
A. I don't know. I am not an expert. 
Q. Do you understand that one of the 
8 primary purposes for which the State Insurance 
9 Fund was created was to provide Workers' 




Q. And I would asswne you as a 
3 policyholder want the State Insurance Fund to 
4 remain solvent so that it can be there to pay any 
5 claims. Is that --
6 
7 
A. Certainly if Pm a member; yes. 
Q. Do you know what the Idaho Insurance 




Q. And so do you have any idea whether or 
· 1 oo·t the State Insurance Fund is a member of the 
· 2 Idaho Guarantee Association? 
3 A. I believe I read somewhere where it is 
~ 4 not. And it may even be prohibited by law from 
I 
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1 Q. Do you have any understanding as to 
2 what the costs to administer any policy is at the 
3 State Insurance Fund? 
4 A. No, not really. 
s Q. Do you have any understanding as to how 
6 many policies the State Insurance Fund has that 
7 are under $2,5007 
8 MR. LOJEK: Policies under $2,500? Or 
9 premiwns? 
0 MS. DUKE: Premiwns. Good 
1 clarification. 
2 THE WITNESS: I believe I have read 
3 somewhere where it is around 28,000-plus. 
4 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And do you have any 
5 knowledge with respect to how many policies there 
6 are out there with premiums over $2,500? 
7 A. Well, I believe I read somewhere that 
8 there is around 32,000 policies. So that would 
9 be a difference of 4,000. Plus or minus. 
0 Q. Why do you believe that you're entitled 
1 to a dividend? 
2 A. I was getting a dividend in the past. 
3 Nobody has told me that my class, which is under 
4 $2,500, from the information I have seen, is 
5 operating at a loss. And so if those dividends 
1 aren't being paid out, when in the past they used 
2 to be, then it seems to me that an argument could 
3 be made that the 28,000 little guys are paying 
4 for the 4,000 big guys. And in the past we used 
5 to get a dividend. 
6 Q. Any other basis why you believe you're 
7 entitled to a dividend? 
8 A. The statute. My reasoning is based on 
9 the statute. We are in a class, apparently. 
0 Q. Any other basis? 
1 A. r would say, to my mind, just simple 
2 fairness. 
3 Q. Any other basis? 
4 A. I'll rely upon my attorneys for the 
5 rest of that. 
6 Q. And when you are saying "the statl:ite," 
7 just so we are clear for the record, you are 




Q. If you were told that the policies of 
11 $2,500 or fewer were operating at a loss, would 
I 
i: you agree that per yow- logic that you would not be entitled to a dividend? 
14 
ts 
MR. LOJEK: I'll object for lack of 
foundation. Calls for speculation. Also calls 
Page 31 j 
! 
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l for an expert opinion from a nonexpert. If you 
2 can possibly answer that question, go ahead. 
3 Subject to my objection. 
4 THE WITNESS: I can't even begin to 
5 give a cogent answer to that question considering 
6 all of the incredible policy considerations that 
7 are involved here. We could spend days talking 
8 about that. Days. So I cannot give you a cogent 
9 answer. And I'm going to follow the advice ofmy 
0 attorney. 
1 Q. He is not instructing you not to 
2 answer. He is saying answer it to the best of 
3 your ability with his objections noted. 
4 A. And my ability to put together a cogent 
5 answer, I cannot do that. 
6 Q. And you can't put together any kind of 
7 summary of what you feel it would take --
8 A. Well --
9 Q. Excuse me. Let me please finish. 
0 Mr. Farber. As I W1derstand it, what you are 
1 telling me is you can't even come up with a 
2 swnmary of apparently these days of 
3 communications you could provide to us on that 
4 answer, is that correct? 
s MR LOJEK: I think you are arguing 
1 with the witness. My objection is that the 
2 question is argumentative. And it is still 
3 asking for speculation. And the question lacks 
4 foundation. 
5 THE WITNESS: And I'm going to follow 
6 the advice of my attorney. 
7 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) He's not instructing you 
8 not to answer. 
9 A. Well, I have given you an answer 
0 previously to the best of my ability. And I'm 
1 going to stand by that. 
2 MR. LOJEK: Counsel, I think he said 
3 that he can't answer the question. 
4 MS. DUKE: I W1derstand. That is what 
5 I'm about to ask. 
6 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So what you are saying 
7 is you are unable to answer the following 
8 question. And, that is, if you were told that 
9 your class actually operates at a loss, and your 
0 class is defined as $2,500 and fewer in premiwns, 
, 1 per your definition, that you can't answer that? 
i 
2 2 MR LOJEK: And my objection is lack of 
! 
i 
? 3 foundation. The question is predicated upon 
I 
I 
2 4 facts not in evidence. And facts which frankly 
! f 5 we disagree with. And you're asking for 
l?age 33 ! 
i 
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1 speculation on the part of this witness. And he · 
2 has told you I think three times now that he 
3 can't answer the question. 
4 THE WITNESS: And I cannot answer the 
5 question. 
6 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So, as I understand it, 
7 the way you define a class under 72-915, or the 
8 way you understand a class to be defined under 
9 72-915 is how? 
0 MR. LOJEK: I'll object, because you 
1 are asking for a legal conclusion. The 
2 interpretation of the statute in question is 
3 really not for Mr. Farber. Nor is it for myself 
4 or Mr. Gordon. Nor is it for Mr. Hall. It is 
5 for the court to interpret the statute. And you 
6 are asking for an interpretation of the statute 
1 right to ask him as a plaintiff in this case what 
2 his understanding is with respect to what he is 
3 referring to as a class. 
4 MR. LOJEK: My instruction to him not 
5 to answer the question stand.5. I think this is a 
6 legal interpretation for the court. Whatever the 
7 court decides we will have to abide with. All of 
8 us. And I don't think that this witness being 
9 produced as a nonexpert can give you an opinion 
O that is within the scope of Rule 26. So, 
1 therefore, it is not discoverable. 
2 MS. DUKE: So you're instructing him 
3 not to answer? 
4 
5 
MR. LOJEK: I am. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following 
6 your counsel's advice? 
7 from a nonexpert. An identified nonexpert. And, 7 A. Yes. 
8 therefore, his interpretation of the statute is 8 Q. What class do you understand you are 
9 totally irrelevant and beyond the scope of Rule 
O 26 and instruct him not to answer. 
1 MS. DUKE: Mr. Lojek, I don't think 
2 that is appropriate at all. I'm asking what his 
3 understanding is. You can make your objections. 
4 And whether or not they will ultimately be 






A. I believe I'm under -- I know that I'm 
in the class where my premium is under $2,500. 
Q. Do you know of any other class that you 







A. I don't understand the question. 
Page 35 i 
! 
Q. When you first learned that you weren't 
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1 receiving a dividend, how did you learn that? 




MS. DUKE: I can rephrase it. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How did you first learn 
6 that you weren't receiving a dividend? 
7 
8 
A. I didn't get one. 
Q. Did you receive any correspondence or 
9 communication from the State Insurance Fund with 
O respect to that? 
1 A. I don't have an independent 
2 recollection of getting any correspondence. I'm 
3 sure there was something. 
4 Q. And did you call the State Insurance 
5 Fund after you realized you didn't get a dividend 
6 the first time? 
7 A . No. 
8 Q, And why not? 
9 A. Because it wasn't worth my time. 
0 Q. Why not? 
1 A. Because it's been my experience in 
2 dealing with state bureaucracies that unless you 
3 confront them directly that -- and I'm talking 
4 about a lawsuit or something -- you don't often 
5 find out what is going on. And certainly I never 
1 got a copy of the minutes, which I became aware 
2 of today, where they talked about this. 
3 Q. Did you ever make a request for any 
4 type of thing like that? 
5 A. No. But they are the ones that are 
6 taking my money. And then they are telling me 
7 that they are going to have less of my money. 
8 If they would have sent me a copy of the minutes, 
9 as I think, in my opinion, they should have sent 
0 every other policyholder that got cut off in thls 
1 class of under $2,500, then I think I might have 




::::~ ;:dh:~p •::~:ve issues ilie 
Q. Any other reason you didn't call the 
16 State Insurance Fund when you realized you were 
7 not receiving a dividend? 
8 A. No. That is the primary reason. 
9 Q. And just so we are clear. You say that 
2 O is the primary reason. Is there any other 
t 1 reason? 
? 2 A. Well, obviously -- I mean, depending on 
I 
T 3 the time when the premium is due. It is not a 
2 4 large sum of money. 
25 
I 
Q. Any other reason? 
I 
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l A. I would say those are the primary 
2 reasons. 
3 Q. But as you sit here today you can't 








Q. Why did you continue to stay with the 
9 State Insurance Fund after you were no longer 
O receiving a dividend? 
1 A. Because I have to have the insurance. 
1 Q. Did you ever have occasion to talk with 
2 any other attorneys about what they were paying 




Q. Or any other companies who provided 




Q. What is your understanding of the 
9 damages that you are seeking in this case? 
0 A. rm relying upon my attorneys to 
1 determine those damages. 
2 And in discussions I have had with a couple other i 2 
!3 
Q. Do you have any understanding as to 
what those damages are? 3 attorneys -- and I don't know when, where, and 
4 what attorneys I have talked to -- I became aware 
S that there were private insurers. It just seemed 
6 to me that it would be easier to pay the money 
7 than to take the time to investigate it. And, in 
8 particular, it was a time versus -- it was 
9 primarily a time issue. 
0 Q. Any other reason why you continued to 
1 stay with the State Insurance Fund after you 
2 stopped receiving a dividend? 
3 A. Habit. 
4 Q. Any other reason? 







A. I'm relying upon my attorneys to 
detennine those damages. 
Q. Do you have any idea as you sit here 
7 today of what type of injunctive relief you are 
I 



















A. I have a belief that the injunctive 
relief, if they prevail, is they are going to 
hopefully obtain an order so that whatever class 
you belonged in, if you fit the criteria of the 
statute, that you will get a dividend/refund. 
Depending on the other criteria of the policy. 
Q. Any other understanding of what 
Page 40 
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1 injunctive relief you are seeking in this case? 
2 Other than what you just testified to. 
3 
4 
A. Not that I can recall. 
Q. Do you have any understanding of the 
5 declaratory relief that you are seeking in this 
6 case? 
7 MR. LOJEK: Do you want to review the 
8 complaint before you answer these questions? She 
9 knows the answers to the questions. 
0 THE WITNESS: I know. But it speaks 
1 for itself. I'm asking for the kind of relief 
2 that is set forth in the complaint. And I'm 
3 relying upon my attorneys. 
4 MS. DUKE: If we can take about a 
5 five-minute break we would appreciate it. 
6 (Recess.) 
7 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) I know we talked about 
8 this before. But I want to make sure the record 
9 is clear. 
0 Was your first contact involving this 
1 case by letter, phone, c>-mail or in person with 
2 your attorneys? 
3 MR LOJEK: And I believe that is part 
4 of the attorney-client relationship. The 
5 attorney-client privilege attaches. And I'm 
1 going to instruct him not to answer the question. 
2 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following 
3 your counsel's advice? 
MR. LOJEK: Just a minute. I am not 
S done. Because I want to be reasonable about 
6 this. If you have any case law that you can show 
7 me right now where I'm wrong, I would be happy to 
8 reconsider. Otherwise, I'm going to stick with 
9 the instruction to my client not to answer the 
O question. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following 
2 your attorney's advice? 
3 A. Yes. 
· 4 MR. LOJEK: And let the record show I 
f 5 have been provided with no authority contrary to 
6 my position. 
7 MR. HALL: lfI may say something. 
' 8 There is absolutely no privilege that attaches to 
f 9 factual events. Where privilege attaches is to 
r O conversations and communications between you and 
f 1 your client. The fact that somebody may have 
I 
2 2 met, or talked, or done something like that is 
j 
~ 3 not a confidential communication. And that is 
! 
F 4 the authority that we rely on. And that is the 
~ S definition of a confidential communication 
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1 between attorney and client. And we are not 
2 asking for confidential communications. We are 
3 asking only for events that may have taken place 
4 outside. We don't want to know anything about 
5 what was said between the attorney and the 
6 client. 
7 MR. LOJEK: Well, let me say this. 1 
8 have researched this issue. Although, I have 
9 nothing but the highest regard for your legal 
O opinion, Rich, I disagree. Let me research it 
1 further. And if you're correct and I'm not we'll 
2 come back and let him answer this question. 
3 Maybe. Because I'm going to add to my objection 
4 that this is beyond the scope of Rule 26. It is 
5 not admissible evidence and it does not lead to 
6 -any admissible evidence how the initial contact 
7 was made. Whether it was done on a factuaJ basis 
8 or any other basis. So I'm going to stick with 
9 my objection and instruction. 
1 to answer the question. Because I think it is 
2 beyond the scope of Rule 26. And I think it does 
3 get into the attomey,client relationship. How 
4 that was fonned I think is irrelevant. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following 
6 your attorneys' advice with respect to 





MS. DUKE: That's all I have. 
MR. LOJEK: We have no questions at 







(Deposition conclude4 at 11 :00 a.m.) 
(Signature requested.) 
O Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And not getting into any O 
1 confidential information. Did you contact your 
2 attorneys first? Or did they contact you first? 
3 MR. GORDON: Same objection. 
4 N!R. LOJEK: l think so, Keely. And, 
5 again, I'm respectfully going to instruct him not 
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1 SCOTT ALAN BECKER, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 





(Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were marked.) 
EXAMINATION 
8 QUESTIONS BY MS. DUKE: 
9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Becker. My name is 
0 Keely Duke. And I'm one of the attorneys who 
1 represents the State Insurance Fund and its board 
2 and manager with respect to a lawsuit that you 
3 have filed against them. With me here today is 
4 Rich Hall, who is lead trial counsel in this 
5 case. And then Mr. Parham, who is an attorney 
1 with you and hopefully it will make it go a 
2 little smoother. IfI ask you a question that 




Q. And if you're answering my questions 





Q. You can see our court reporter is 
10 taking down everything that I'm saying. And 
I 
} 1 everything that you are going to say. And 
t 2 anything that the attorneys here say today. So 
i 3 it is important that you and I not speak over one 
i 4 another. And let one another finish our 
i 
I 
i 5 sentences. Okay? 
l 
6 with the State Insurance Fund. And Mr. Alcorn, f 6 A. All right. 
I 
7 who is the manager of the State Insurance Fund. i 7 Q. If I don't let you firush an answer, 
i 
I 
8 This deposition is being taken pursuant i 8 please let me know. It is not my intent to cut 
i 
i 
9 to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I asswne 
0 that's fine? 
l- 9 you off. So just let me know that you are not 
1 
2 
TO finished with your answer ifI start up on 
MR. LOJEK: True. ? 1 another question. Okay? 
; 
Q. (BY MS . DUKE) Have you ever had your 22 
! 
A. All right. 
3 deposition taken before? Q. It is important throughout the 
4 
5 
A. No. 2 4 deposition today that you provide audible 
~ 
Q. I'll go through a couple ground rules ~5 responses, saying "yes" or "no," which you are 
; 
Page s l 
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doing so far, rather than head shakes or head 
nods, because it is the only way that she can 
record what it is you are saying. With that all 
said, this is not an endurance contest. If for 
some reason you need a break, please let us know. 
The only thing I ask from you is that ifl have 
asked you a question that we not take a break 
until you have answered my question. Okay? 
A. All right. 
Q. If you could state your full name for 
the record? 
A. Scott Alan Becker. 
Q. And what is your date of birth? 
Q. And where were you born? 
A. I was born in Kittery, Maine. 
Q. How did you come out here to Idaho? 
A. My father retired -- actually, was in 
the military and retired out of Mountain Home. 
Q. And so when did you move to Idaho? 
A. It would have been '77. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No. 































































Q. And what was your ex-wife's name? 
A. My ex-wife's name was -- maiden name? 
Q. Maiden name. Sure. 
A. Marjorie Hamilton. 
Q. Did she take your name? 
A. She did . 
Q. And where does she reside? 
A. In Boise. 
Q. We provided as Exhibit l to the 
deposition a notice of deposition duces tecum for 
you. If you could take a look at that and let me 
know if you have seen that document before? 
A. I have seen this document. 
Q. And in that document we asked for some 
documents. In addition to asking you to be here 
today we asked for some documents that you might 
have in your possession. 
Have you brought any documents with you 
today? 
A. I have supplied my attorneys with the 
documents that I do have. And I believe they 
have been given to you. 
Q. Okay. What documents did you supply to 
your attorneys? 
A. Actually, they would have been the 
Page 8 
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1 premiwn is under $2,500." 1 documents that the State Ins~ance Company had 
2 supplied me with or had given me as far as 2 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How many letters were 
3 dealing with not distributing dividends to people 
4 that don't pay over $2,500 in their premiums 
5 every year. 
6 Q. So letters? 
7 A. Exactly. 
8 Q. Anything other than letters from the 










A. Honestly, I don't know. I mean, I have 
been dealing with this for quite a few months. 
mean, any that I had in my possession I have 
given to them. 
Q. Did you give them a copy of your 
policy, too? 
A. I believe so. 
1 A. As far as I know, no. 11 Q. Any other materials other than the 
2 MS. DUKE: And, Counsel, I know we have 12 letters regarding the dividends and your policy 
i 
3 been provided documents through like attachments i 3 that you provided to your counsel? 
! 
4 to affidavits. Obviously, we haven't received 
5 the answers to our discovery yet. So I'm not 
6 quite certain which letters are his and which 
7 aren't. I have them copied. So hopefully we'll 
8 be able to go through those. As we progress, if 
9 we need to, maybe we can get the copies from your 
0 office. Just to make sure we are talking about 





A. Would you repeat that? 
Q. Any other documents that you provided 
i 6 to your counsel related to this case other than 







A. As far as I know; no. 
Q. So ifwe look at Exhibit I, I would 
21 assume that you don't maintain any journals, 
I 
I 




3 letters that come from the State Insurance Fund 
4 saying, "Congratulations, we are not going to 
5 give you a dividend this year because your 
Page 
? 3 have related to any of your claims in this case? 
24 
i 




Q. And by "at this time, no," did you at 
Page 10 
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1 some point earlier have such documents? 
2 A. Up until th.is time, no . 
3 Q. So you haven't had any of those types 
4 of documents that would be responsive. But it 
5 sounds like maybe in the future you could? 
6 A. It seems to be going that way. 
7 
8 
Q. And why do you say that? 
A. Well, obviously, I'm going to have to 
9 keep up on this. 






Q, Do you maintain a diary? 
A. No. 
Q. And as of today's date have you made 
5 any written statements with respect to your 
6 claims in this case? 
7 MR. LOJEK: Himself? Not through his 
8 attorneys? 
9 MS. DUKE: Correct. 
0 THE WITNESS : No. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Any notes that you have 
2 taken? Obviously, not related to what you and 
3 your attorneys have discussed. But any notes 
4 that you have jotted down regarding your claims 
5 in this case? 
Page 
i 1 A. No. 
· 2 Q. And then if we look to Item No. 2 on 
! 
I 3 Exhibit l . Copies of all documents, photographs, 
! 4 et cetera, in your possession that have not 
I S previously been provided to us. 
16 As I understand it, all we are dealing 
7 with document-wise from you is the policy and 
8 some letters you provided to your counsel. So 
i 
! 










No. 2. Is that correct? 
A. As far as I know. 
Q. And same for No. 3? You don't know of 
~ 3 anything else other than the letters you provided 













description of your educational background? 
A. Graduated from Meridian High School. 








two-and-a-half years. I was working part time 
for the business. And at that time I needed to 
decide whether I wanted to continue my education 
2 3 or buy the business. And I bought the business. 
i 
~4 Q. Any other college education or trade 
I 
I 
? S school ex.perience? Anything like that? 
E>age 12 
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Q. With respect to your business. What is 





A. I own Marv's Framing and Gallery. 
Q. And how long have you owned that? 
A. Since 1992. 





Q. How did you come to acquire Marv's 





Q. And so you own it and have been 








A. As far as an official title? No. 
Q. Somebody that at least satisfies the 
j 9 roles of managing the business, do you have 






A. You are looking at him. 
2 A. Well, I had worked for Marv since 1981 t 2 Q. How many employees do you have 
currently? 3 while I was going to school. And it came about 





A. I have one full-time employee. And one 
5 And I started going to school. And then it came 15 part time. 
i 
6 about that he wanted to retire and move out of 
7 town. It was a good deal at the time. And I 
8 figured hey, I can acquire this business. I can 




Q. And where is it located? 
A. 590 l Overland Road. 
Q. And do you have any other partners in 














Q. Have you ever been larger than that? 
A. I have. 
Q. What is the largest that you have been? 
A. Oh, I believe -- I can't remember ifl 





Q. And when was that? 
~3 A. Oh, that would have been -- it was 
f 4 definitely before 2001. So probably -- oh, it 
! 
2 5 was probably in 2000. 
I 
Page 13 j Page 14 
! 
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Q. And what kind of business is it? 
A. We sell art. Framed pictures. 




Q. And when did you meet with them? 
A. I met with them yesterday. 
Q. Any other times? 
4 for obtaining Workers' Compensation and insurance 4 A. No. 
5 for the company? 
6 A. That would be me. 
7 Q. And I would assume that is the case 
8 from 1992 to this day? 
9 A. Yes. 
0 Q. Prior to 1992 when you acquired Marv's, 
1 when you were working there, did you have that 
2 role at that time, too? 
3 A. As far as? 
4 Q. Being the one responsible for obtaining 
5 Workers' Compensation insurance? 
6 A. When I was working for Marv? 
7 Q. Correct. 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. What did you do to prepare for your 
0 deposition today? 
1 A. What did I do to prepare for my 
2 deposition? There is really not a lot I can 
3 prepare for at this time. 
4 
5 
Q. Well, did you meet with your attorneys? 






Q. And how long did you meet with them? 
A . Maybe half an hour. Hour. 
] 7 Q. Did you review any documents in 
i 
1 
I 8 preparation for your deposition today? 
l 
I 
! 9 A. We did. 
I 
i 
i O Q. And what were the documents that you 
i 1 reviewed in preparation for your deposition 
! 
T2 today? 
A. Well, I was informed that we had just 




15 I'm not an anomey. And that is why I have 
I 
I 
i 6 these attorneys. Actually, I don't know the 
! 
i 7 names of the docwnents. 
18 Q. Well, describe for me what it was that 
I 
i9 you were reviewing, then? 
I 
i 
± 0 A. They were the figures from the State 
J 
! 
~ 1 Insurance Fund. 
' I 
t 2 Q. And when you say figures from the State 
i 








A. I guess it would have been premiums in 
and what you have all paid out. 
Page l6 
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1 Q. What other documents did you review in 
2 preparation for your deposition today? 
3 A. You know, there is a box load of them 
4 there. It is going to take an army to go through 
5 that. 
6 Q. And I'm not interested in future arrnies 
7 going through anything. What I'm interested in 
8 is what you reviewed yesterday and what you 
9 recall reviewing. 
0 
1 
A. Well, that would be it. 
Q. I'm going to hand you what has been 
2 marked as Exhibit No. 2 to your deposition. It's 
3 entitled, "Class Action Complaint and Demand for 
4 Jury Trial." 
5 Have you read through this complaint at 
6 any time? 
7 MR. LOJEK: It was filed about a year 
8 ago and --
9 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I had gone through 
0 something like this. I couldn't guarantee you 
1 this was the exact paper I looked at. 
2 Q. (BY MS . DUKE) So is it fair to say 
3 then you don't know whether or not you have read 
4 the Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury 
5 Trial? 
MR. LOJEK: I'll object. Because that 
2 is not fair to say. 
3 MS. DUKE: Well, he's the one 
I 
4 answering. If you would let him answer. 
fs THE WITNESS: I'm pretty sure I've gone 
6 through this. This has been quite a while ago . 
l 7 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So your testimony then 
1 
8 today would be you have read it? 
9 MR. LOJEK: It's been asked and 
+ 0 answered. He said he is pretty sure that he has 
l 1 read it. I'll object, because your question is 
j 
l 2 repetitive. 
I 
i 
t3 Q. (BY MS . DUKE) You can go ahead and 
I 
i 
~ 4 answer. 
I 
A. Could you repeat that question, again? 
Q. As I understand it, your testimony is 





A. Like I said, I'm pretty sure I have 
1 9 read this. It's been quite a while, though. 
I 
to Q. So if you have read it do you remember 
11 
! 
what the details of the complaint say? 
I 
~ 2 A. The details of the complaint say 
i 
i 
2 3 that just because I don't pay $2,500 a year in 
I 
~ 4 premiwns I should get a dividend back like r used 
I 
? 5 . to get. And somebody in the middle of that 
i 
Page 17 i 
j 
Page 18 
9 (Pages 17 to 18) 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000214 
1 changed everything. 
2 Q. Do you have an understanding beyond 
3 that as to what it says? 
4 MR LOJEK: I'll object to the extent 
5 you are asking for a legal conclusion from a lay 
6 witness. 




A. Do you want me to answer that? 
MR. LOJEK: Sure. To the best of your 
1 ability. Understanding you are not a lawyer. 
2 THE WITNESS: As far as I know, the 
3 state statute doesn't say that you can draw the 
4 line at $2,500 and say, "Hey, we are not paying a 
5 dividend to people that pay less than $2,500 a 
6 year." 
7 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Other than that. and 
8 your prior answer, do you have any other 
9 W1derstanding as to what the Class Action 
O Complaint and Demand for Jwy Trial says? 
l :MR WJEK: I have the same objection. 
2 TIIE WITNESS: Say that again. I mean, 
3 as far as I'm concerned, that is the suit. 
4 
5 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What I would like to 
do -- and I don't know if you'll be able to do 
Page 
1 this now or ifwe need to go off the record so 
2 you can read the complaint. But I would like to 
3 know if you, as you're sitting here today, can 
4 verify that everything contained within these 19 
5 pages of the Class Action Complaint and Demand 
6 for Jury Trial is truthful? Can you do that? 




Q. Okay. We can go off the record. 
MR. LOJEK: 1'11 object to the question 
1 to the extent that I'm not sure what you mean by 
2 "true" is. There are three named plaintiffs. 
3 The class has not yet been certified. This 
4 witness may or may not know anything about the 
5 other plaintiffs in the case. And he may not 
6 know all of the details that his attorneys have 
7 looked into. I'm here as his attorney. And it's 
8 our position that the allegations of the 
1 








the State Insurance Fund disagrees. That is the 
nature of the lawsuit. 
I think when you are asking this 
witness whether or not each and every allegation 
of the complaint that has been carefully drafted 
by his attorneys is true or not, you are asking 
Page 20 
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1 for, in essence, a tegal conclusion. And that 
2 would be the basis of my objection. 
3 As I think coW1sel and the court would 
4 know, people in Mr. Becker's position are not 
5 really in a position to read statutes and draw 
6 conclusions from statutes. That is something 
7 that lawyers and judges are trained to do. It 
8 would be beyond his education and experience. 
9 And I think to that extent the question is 
O tmfair. And I would add that to my objection. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And given those 





A. That's all true. 
Q. Excuse me. The introduction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then ifwe move to "Part One: 
5 Parties," it says, "All of the named plaintiffs 
6 are now and during some or all of the years 
7 comprising the class period have been conducting 
8 business in the State ofldaho.'' 





Q. "All of the named plaintiffs have 
3 related to the introduction. Which is on page 3 during some or all of such period had one or more 
4 one and two. Anything related to you in the ' 4 employees whom they have been required by law to 
5 "Parties" section of the complaint And then any 5 provide with Workers' Compensation insurance 
6 6 coverage." allegation contained within "Part one: Factual 
7 Allegations." Which are pages five through 
8 seven. And really what I would like you to do is 
9 verify as to whether you know they are accurate 
O and true. 
1 THE WITNESS: Pages two? 
2 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Pages one and two. 
3 A. Okay. 
4 Q . Ending prior to "Part One: Parties." 
5 So we can start there. 
Page 21 
7 With respect to you, I assume that is 
8 true? 
9 A. Yes. 
Q. "All of named plaintiffs have during 
some or all of the class periods subscribed to 
the Fund for the purpose of obtaining their 
Workers' Compensation insurance coverage." 
I would assume that is true with 
respect to you? 
!?age 22 
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Q. Then if you look at Paragraph 2(b). 
3 "Plaintiff Becker is a small business operator 
4 who conducts business as Marv's Framing Gallery 
5 at 5901 Overland Road in Boise and who lives in 




Is that true and accurate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what I would like you to do is 
O tum to page five starting at paragraph seven and 
1 going through paragraph 14 and tell me whether 
2 you believe the allegations contained in those 
3 paragraphs are true and accurate as they relate 
4 to you. 
5 MR. LOJEK: And I'll object again 
6 because what you are essentially asking this 
7 witness to do is to go through a statutory 
8 construction or statutory analysis, which I do 
9 not think he is qualified to do. I think he has 
O told you from his point of view as a layperson 
1 what the thrust of this lawsuit is all about. 
2 That an arbitrary line has been drawn. And that 
3 people who are paying premium of$2,500 or less 
4 are not getting dividends. And he believes that 
5 it is unfair and contrary to law as explained to 
Page 23 
I 
1 him by his attorneys. And he will tell you, if 
2 you get around to asking him relevant questions, 
3 that he had continually received dividends or 
4 many, many years. And then all of a sudden they 
5 stopped. 
6 MS. DUKE: Mr. Lojek, obviously, we are 
7 ta.king his deposition. It would certainly be 
8 appropriate if you would stop with the corrunentary 
9 statements. 
0 MR. LOJEK: Let me add to my objections 
1 that I signed this complaint fully understanding 
2 that Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
3 Procedure puts certain requirements on me and the 
4 other anomeys who are with me on this lawsuit. 
5 I th.ink it is somewhat insulting to ask my client 
6 whether or not these allegations are true or not. 
7 They are true to the best of our knowledge and 
8 belief. This is a good faith lawsuit It is not 
9 a bullshit lawsuit. And we are here to answer 
O your questions to the extent that they are 
1 relevant. I don't think that the witness can 
2 answer the questions that you are asking him. I 
3 think they are very unfair because he is not a 
4 lawyer. 
· 5 MS. DUKE: And you have made your 
Page 24 
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1 record and stated that. And if you have taken 
2 some personal offense to the questions it wasn't 
3 intended. And I don't understand why you would 
4 take offense to that. I have a right to ask 
5 him -- to see if he feels that based on his 
6 knowledge he believes it's an accurate 
7 representation of what he understands his claims 
8 as a plaintiff in this lawsuit to be. And I 
9 would like him to answer the question. And your 
0 objections are noted. 
1 TI-IE Wl1NESS: And, yes, I do believe 
2 it's a fair representation. 
3 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) A truthful and accurate 
4 representation; correct? 
5 A. Yes, 
6 Q. And with respect to Exhibit No. 3. 
7 This is entitled, 11 First Amended Class Action 




Have you seen th.at document before? 
A. I believe I have. 
Q. Do you know why it has not been filed? 
2 MR. LOJEK: I'll object on the basis 
3 that you are asking him for a legal conclusion. 
4 And also attempts to invade the attorney-client 
5 privilege. And to the extent that your 
1 understanding is based on any communications you 
2 have had with me, Bruce Bistline, or Phil Gordon, 
3 that is not an appropriate question and you 
4 should not include that in your answer. 
5 Tiffi WITNESS: So the question would be? 
6 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you know why it 
7 hasn't been filed? And are you able to answer 
8 that question based on what your attorney just 
9 stated? 
,o MR. LOJEK: Same objection. 
' 1 THE WITNESS: I guess I would have to 
· 2 say I'm not able to answer that question. 





A. I do not. 
Q. Have you ever met him before? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Have you ever spoken to him on the 
9 phone or anything like that? 
0 
1 
A. I have not. 
Q. How about anyone who operates the 
2 Critter Clinic? Do you know who they are? 
I 
r3 A. I do not. 
24 
ts 
Q. Again, no conversations or meeting with 





13 (Pages 25 to 26) 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000218 
1 A. Not with the Critter Clinic. 
2 Q. Do you have an understanding as to what 
3 is meant by a class action lawsuit? 
4 A. 1do. 
5 Q. And what is that understanding? 
6 A. My understanding is it will benefit 
7 everyone. 
8 Q. And when you say it will benefit 
9 everyone. Who is the everyone? 
0 A. The everyone would be anybody that pays 
1 less than $2,500 a year to the State Insurance 
2 Fund. 
3 Q. And have you had any conversations with 
4 other policyholders who pay $2,500 or less with 
5 the State Insurance FW1d? 
6 A. I have. 
7 Q. Who? 
8 A. 1 couldn't tell you. I mean, honestly, 
9 I could not tell you. 
0 Q. Not a single name? 
1 A. I talk to people aJl of the time. 
2 Small business owners all of the time that don't 


























A. I talk to so many people every single 
day that it is disgust mg. 
Q. So the answer to the question is you 
cannot provide a single name from anybody you 
have talked to that has a premium of $2,500 or 
less from the State Insurance Fund? 
A. As far as full names; no. 
Q. Any part of a name? 
A. As far as full names; no. 
Q. Any part of a name? 
A. Any part of a name, no. Imean. 
offhand; no. 
Q. Not the names of companies? 
A. Offhand; no. 
Q. Do you have any experience in the 
insurance industry? 




Q. Do you have any education with respect 
to the insurance industry? 
4 naming one out of the bag, I couldn't name one. 4 A. Excuse me? 




Q. Any education that you have received 
Page 28 
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1 with respect to the insurance industry? 
2 A. As far as schooling? 
3 Q. Schooling. Training. Seminars. 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. We have already talked about this. But 
6 with respect to who in your office handles 
7 obtaining Workers' Compensation insurance, I 
8 understand that to be you? 
9 A. Correct. 
0 Q. And that's been you since 1992? 
1 A. Correct. 
2 Q, And so T would assume that you're the 
3 person who looks at various companies that you 
4 may be interested in obtaining Workers' 
5 Compensation insurance from; is that correct? 
6 A. To tell you the hon~st - well, 1992 
7 was a long time ago. I think I did look around. 
8 And, you know, what made the State Insurance 
9 Fund - what kind of turned me that way is when 
O the dividends actually made the policy 




up going that way. 
Q. And we are going to get there. But my 
question was, would you have been the individual 


























t>age 29 1 
insurers throughout the years to see who you 
wanted to obtain insurance from for your company? 
A. I wouldn't say throughout the years. I 
mean, I picked one years ago and I stuck with it. 
Q. And we'll talk about that. I assume 
the one you picked is the Idaho State Insurance 
Fund? 
A. You assume correct. 
Q. And with respect to that evaluation 
that you did, what other companies did you talk 
to? Other than the Idaho State Insurance Fund. 
A. You know, I did talk to another company 
back then. But, honestly, I can't remember which 
one it was. 
Q. Would you have records as to the 
company you talked to? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you actually submit an application 
for insurance with them? 
A. Oh, I believe I probably called 
somebody on the phone and got a rate quote. But 
as far as any paperwork; no. 
MR. LOJEK: Let me advise you, also, 
Ms. Duke is asking for accurate answers, to the 
best of your recollection. And if you don't 
Page 30 
15 (Pages 29 to 30) 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000220 
1 recall, she's not asking for you to guess or to 
2 give her some supposition. So if you know, tell 
3 her. If you don't know, don't guess. 
4 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So do you recall whether 
5 or not you actually went through the process and 
6 obtained, you know, a commionent from a company 
7 as to providing Workers' Compensation coverage 




A. I never did obtain a C-Ommitrnent. 
Q. When was this that you were looking 
2 into the Workers' Compensation insurance and who 
3 was going to be your Workers' Compensation 
4 carrier? 
5 A. Like I said, I can't remember the exact 
6 date I hired my first employee. It possibly 
7 would have been in '94 . '93. 
8 Q. But, as I understand it, the only 
9 Workers' Compensation carrier that you have 
0 worked with, and obtained coverage from since you 
1 purchased Marv's, has been the State Insurance 
2 Fund? 
3 A . Yes. 
4 
5 
Q. And why did you select the State 
Insurance Fund? 
1 A. One of the main reasons I selected the 
2 State Insurance Fund was -- well, I had known -
3 my prior boss had used the State Insurance Fund. 
4 And he had gotten dividends, also. And at the 
5 end of the year it just makes the policy more 
6 affordable. 
7 Q. So the question was why you elected to 
8 go with the State Insurance Fund. And, as I 
9 understand it, your prior boss used it. Used the 




A. It was affordable. 
Q. Any other reasons? 





Q. So I would assume your answer is no, 
I 6 then? 
I 7 A. Correct. 
1 
a Q. When you say that it was affordable. 
~: Wh: m:e.:,~:~:::~:d::~e7is you wottld 
I f 1 pay your premiwn. I mean, when you come to look 
I 
2 2 at it, at the end of every year you would get 
I 
I 





premium. So in all reality it was kind of like 
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1 Q. Do you recall what your premiums have 
2 been over the course of the last six years? 
3 A. Offhand; no. I could give you an 
4 approximate for this year. I mean, they have 





Q. What is your approximate for this year? 
A. I think we are right at $1,600. 
Q. Have they ever been higher than that? 
A. I believe so. When I had a few more 
O employees. 
1 Q. Do you recall the lowest your premiums 
2 ever were? Or just an estimate? Not an exact 
3 amount, but an estimate? 
4 A. I would say probably when I first 
5 started up I think they were $800 or $900 a year. 
6 Q. And have you had any losses during any 
7 of the years that you have had Workers' 
8 Compensation insurance with the State Insurance 
9 Fund? 
0 A. I th.ink I have had -- well, I know for 
1 sure we had one where a guy had cut his hand and 
2 had reqwred a couple stitches. And I was trying 
3 to remember that this morning. I can't remember 
4 if we had another one. But it would have been 
5 the same thing. 
1 
2 
Q. Do you remember when those were? 
A. The exact dates, no. I mean, I could 
3 give you an approximate. I believe that we had 
4 Randy cut his hand -- it would have been two 
5 years ago, I believe, in the summer. 
6 
7 
Q. And then you think there was one other? 
A. Right. That would have been probably a 
8 couple years earlier that Kirk had done the same 
9 thing. Cut his hand on a piece of glass. 
0 Q. And do you recall what the value of 
1 those losses were? Or the benefits that were 
2 received by the State Insurance Fund --
3 MR. LOJEK: Just a second, Scott. I'm 
4 going to object. This is supposed to be 
5 discovery, Keely. And the questions you are 
6 asking are in the records of the State Insurance 
7 Fwid. You have all of this information, And you 
8 need only to ask your client to give you the 











would think that the records of the State 
Insurance Fund would be more precise as to dates 
and exact amounts. And I think all you are doing 
here is running up the bill for your client. For 
our clients. And we have to pay the deposition 
2 5 transcript by the page. And I think this is an 
i 
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abuse of discovery. 1 MR. LOJEK: Maybe we should get a 
MS. DUKE: I very much disagree. 2 ruling from the court on th.is. Unfortunately, we 
1vfR. LOJEK: Let me finish and make my 3 don't have a judge assigned to this case right 
record. Jf this is going to be the way you 4 now. So why don't we continue th.is deposition. 
conduct discovery in this case, then we are going 5 We'll answer your interrogatories as best we can. 
to have to go to court and ask for some guidance 6 And then we'll come back after we get a ruJ ing 
from the court. Because you cannot use the 7 from whatever judge is assigned to the case. 
deposition process to make me, and Mr. Bistline, 8 Would that be satisfactory? 
and my client sit here hour after hour answering 9 MS. DUKE: I don't know what kind of 
questions for information you already have and 0 ruling you are saying you want to get. So, no, 
your client has. It is an abuse of the discoveiy 1 I'm not saying .that is satisfactory. You can do 
process. So I would ask you to try to find out 2 whatever you want to do and bring whatever issue 
from this witness infonnation that you do not 3 you want to bring to the court. Whether I think 
have. And let's move along, please. 4 it is valid or not we can address in our 
MS . DUKE: Mr. Lojek, first of all, we 5 briefings. 
have been going about 50 minutes. So I'm not 6 7v1R. LOJEK: Let me talk to my client 
quite sure what you mean by hour after hour. 7 and Mr. Bistline as to whether we will continue 
le Second, I have eveiy right to question this with the deposition. For the record, we will sit 
I 
witness with respect to what his knowledge is. t9 here as long as your questions are relevant and 
I 
And there is nothing wrong with doing that. Yes, to asking for information that you do not already 
I'm sure there are records that we can look to. *l have. I just want to make that veiy clear on the i 
i 
But I have every right to know what he knows as a f2 record. 
party in this case. And for you to assert }3 MS. DUKE: And I don't agree with your 
i 
otherwise I think is a gross misrepresentation of ?4 characterization. 
l 
what the discoveiy rules provide. 25 (Recess.) 
i 
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1 MR. LOJEK: We are going to continue 
2 this deposition at this time. We don't wish to 
3 Wlduly burden the court. There is a presumptive 
4 rule in the federal jurisdiction, as far as I'm 
5 concerned, that a deposition should not take 
6 longer than three hours. We are going to allow 
7 this deposition to go forward for three hours 
8 from its commencement. And I would ask you to 
9 please get to the point and ask your questions 
O seeking whatever relevant information that you 
1 deem necessary or advisable for your client. At 
2 the end of three hours we'll make a decision. 
3 But the probability is that the decision at that 
4 time will be that the deposition will be 
5 continued until we get a ruling from whatever 
6 judge is assigned to the case. 
7 MS. DUKE: Well, first of all, it is 
8 not a federal case. Second, the federal rules 
9 actually state seven hours. Third, we are 
obviously premature into the deposition with 
respect to how long it is going to go and what is 
going to be done, But certainly with the lengthy 
objections, and you taldng ten minutes to discuss 
1 Please also be forewarned that if you decide to 
2 tenninate the deposition we will seek all fees 
3 and costs as a sanction for failing to pennit us 
4 to do the discovery we are entitled to do because 
S this gentleman filed a lawsuit. 
6 MR. LOJEK: I appreciate the threat. 
7 Let's continue the deposition. 
8 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So what were your losses 
9 with respect to those two claims? 
0 A. The first one, like I said, I am not 
· 1 sure whether Kirk -- that would have been the 
2 first one. I'm not sure whether he had a loss or 
3 not. I don't know. With Randy's I did, because 
I think I saw the bill and it was somewhere 
5 around like $300 for three stitches. But, as far 
as I know, that was it 
Q. And as best you sit here today you 
8 can't recall any other losses on your policies 





A. As far as 1 know, no. 
Q. Let's tum, then, to dividends . . 













whether you are going to walk out after 50 ! 
. f . . d I . h · ~5 
A. Well --
mmutes o questions, 1s e aymg t e proceedmg. i 
I 
.MR. LOJEK: Excuse me. Can I just have 
!?age 37 j 
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1 a standing objection to the extent that you are 
2 asking for a legal conclusion. Because dividends 
3 in th.is context is a matter oflaw subject to 
4 various interpretations of the Idaho statute. 
5 MS. DUKE: Then I'll rephrase the 
6 question. Because I don't th.ink it ca!ls for a 
7 legal conclusion. 
8 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What is your 
9 understanding of a dividend that you have 
0 received in the past from the State Insurance 
1 Fund? 
2 A. My understanding is basically all of 
3 your premiums are paid. Obviously, they are 
4 going to pay out on some claims. And they aJso 
5 need to have a reserve set aside. But anything 
6 above that reserve they give out as dividends. 
7 Q. And how did you gain that 
8 understanding? 
9 A. I have other insurance companies that 
0 give me dividends. 
1 Q. What other insurance companies give you 
1 everything through USAA as far as auto and home. 
2 Q. Any other companies that you have that 
3 issue dividends? 
4 A. As far as I know, no. 
5 Q. And with respect to the State Insurance 
6 Fund. Turning back to the State Insurance Fund. 
7 What is your understanding as to why a dividend 
8 is provided to policyholders? 
9 A. I thought I just answered that 
O question. Didn't I just answer it? 
1 Q. Well, the question before was what your 
2 understanding of a dividend was. 
3 A. Well, obviously, they have a surplus 
4 above their reserve. And what that surplus is 
5 is divided among their policyholders. 
6 - Q. But do you have an understanding as to 




A. As to why? 
Q. Correct. And if you don't know, that 
i f 1 is fine. I'm just asking if you have an 
I 
2 dividends? 2 2 understanding as to why --
3 A. One would be USAA. 
4 Q. And what type of policy is that? 






A. As far as I know, it is a nonprofit. 
2 4 But I could be wrong there. But, as far as I 
2 5 know, it is a nonprofit. 
i 
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1 Q, Any other basis for your understanding 
2 as to why the State Insw-ance Fund issues 
3 dividends? 
4 A. Say that again? 
5 Q. Any other basis, other than believing 
6 it's a nonprofi~ that supports yow-
7 understanding of why they distribute dividends? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. And with respect to the dividends. 
O What is yow- understanding as to when those 






A. When they are paid? 
Q. Correct. 
A. As far as a date? A month? 
Q. Yeah. A month. 
7 A. Well, it used to be they would give us 
8 ow- dividends the first part of every year. I 
9 think it was January or February. 
O Q. And what is your understanding as to 
1 who receives dividends from the State Insurance 
2 Fund currently? 
3 A . My understanding is people that pay 
4 premiums over $2,500 receive a dividend. 
5 Q. And do you know how long that has been 
Page 41 
1 the case? 
2 A. I can't remember the exact date. But I 
3 know this happened just shortly after they 
4 required Worlanen's Comp for everyone in the state 
5 as far as farm workers and things like that. 
6 Q. And so did you think that had something 
7 to do with the State Insurance Fund not providing 
8 dividends to policyholders under $2,500? 
9 A. Well, obviously, it must have. Because 
O we quit getting dividends. 
1 Q. Do you know who makes the decisions at 
, 2 the State Insurance Fund as to who will receive 
3 dividends? 
4 A. I do not know. 
5 Q. Do you know who at the State Insurance 
6 Fund makes a decisiop as to whether anyone will 





A. Do I know who? 
Q. Correct. 
A. J do not know. 
Q. Is it your understanding that the 




A. I would believe they would if they have 
2 5 a surplus of money. 
I 
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1 Q. And what is your basis for that 
2 understanding or opinion? 
3 A. I mean, we had always gotten dividends 
4 in the past. And then it stopped. But, 
5 obviously, people that pay more still get their 
6 dividends. 
7 Q. But my question was related to whether 
8 or not you believe that the State Insurance Fund 
9 has to or is required to provide dividends to its 
0 policyholders? 
1 A. I believe they do. 
2 Q. And my follow-up question to that was, 
3 why do you believe that? 
4 A. I believe that because I believe they 
5 are a nonprofit. And when they have a surplus of 
6 money they are required to give it back to their 
7 policyholders. 
8 Q. Other than that being a belief of 
9 yours, do you have any other basis for that 
O understanding or belief? 
1 A. That is why I have attorneys. 
2 Q. So the answer would be "no"? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Do you recall as you sit here today 
5 what your dividend was in the year 2001? 
Page 
I 
11 A. Did I get a dividend in 200 I? 
2 Q. I don't know. Did you? 
3 A. I can't recall. I know one of them 
4 back then was a pretty good dividend. $400 or 
5 $500. Something like that. 
6 Q. Let me start with that. As you sit 
7 here today, from 1992 through 2007, what years 
8 within that time period did you receive a 
9 dividend? 
~o A. Boy, without going through boxes of 
t: paperwork of mine --:MR. LOJEK: We'll be happy to ask the 
t3 
State Insurance Fund in an interrogatory and 
4 supplement his answer. 
~5 
THE WI1NESS: You could probably tell 
6 me. You have that information right in front of 
i7 you. 
I 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) the point is I'm asking 
t98 I you right now as to your memory without looking 
at any documents whether you --20 
I 
' 
21 A. OtThand I couldn't tell you. 
l 
2 2 Q. Let me finish my question, please. 
I 
? 3 What I'm asking you is whether or not you know as 
i 
l t 4 you sit here today what years between the years 
1992 and 2006 that you received dividends? Can 
44 
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1 you answer that? 
2 A. I couldn't tell you specifically what 
3 years I received dividends. 
4 Q. And, therefore, I assume you also 
5 cannot, as you sit here today, tell us what years 
6 you did not receive dividends? 
7 
8 
A. I could not answer that today. 
Q. Other than the policy that you have 
9 with the State Insurance Fund there is no other 
O agreement that you and the State Insurance Fund 





MR LOJEK: Could you read the question 
(Record read.) 
MR. LOJEK: I'll object to that 
6 question as calling for a legal conclusion, in · 
7 part. Go ahead and answer. 
8 TI-IE WITNESS: As far as I know, no. 
9 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Does your policy with 
O the State Insurance FW1d, as you understand it, 
1 say anything about dividends? 
2 A. Say that again? 
3 Q. Does your policy with the State 
4 Insurance Fund, as you understand it, say 
5 anything about dividends? 
1 A. I don't believe it says anything -- I 
2 don't believe it says anything in there about me 
3 not getting a dividend if I didn't pay more than 
4 $2,500. 
5 Q. My question is different than that. 
6 And my question is, does the policy, as you 




A. I do not know. 








A. That's why I have attorneys. 
Q. Do you know what a deviation is? 
A. As far as? 
Q. The insurance industry. 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any understanding as to 
8 whether you are receiving a deviation that lowers 
9 your premium on your policy? 
f O A. ~ far as I know, I am not aware of 
I f 1 one. As a matter of fact, I'm paying a higher 
I r 2 rate right now than I believe I should. 
j r 3 Q. Why do you say that? 
14 A. Because I'm classified as basically a 
i 
i 
~ 5 furniture making/cabinet making shop. What I do 
! 
Page 45 : 
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1 doesn't require a fraction of the tools that a 
2 cabinet maker1s shop would require. 
3 Q. And how long have you been classified 






A. Since the beginning. 
Q. Since 1992? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Have you ever done anything about that? 
A. I have talked to people at the State 
0 Insurance Fund about it. And. really, there is 
1 not a lot I can do. 
2 Q. When was the last time you talked to 
3 somebody about it at the State Insurance Fund 





A. Oh, probably a couple years ago. 
Q. Do you remember who you talked to? 
A. No. 
Q. But going back to a deviation. As I 
9 understand it, you don't know what a deviation 
0 is; correct? 
1 MR LOJEK: If it will help you. We 
2 are willing to stipulate that this witness is not 
3 an expert witness. And he is certainly not 
4 knowledgeable about the insurance business. 
s THE WITNESS: Correct. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And, therefore, I would 
2 assume that also means you don't know whether or 
3 not you're receiving a deviation on your policy 
4 premium that lowers your premiums; correct? 
5 A. Well, if it lowers my premiums -- my 
6 premiums go up, up, up, and up every year. So if 
7 you are lowering my premiums you are not doing a 
8 very good job of it. 
9 Q. So l would assume you have no idea or 
0 understanding as to who, policyholder-wise at the 
1 State Insurance Fund, receives a deviation; is 




Q. Do you have an insurance agent that you 




A. As far as for Workmen's Comp? 
Q. For Workers' Comp. 
A. No. 
f 9 Q. Have you ever had an insurance agent 
~ O that you worked with with respect to Workers' 
i 
I f 1 Compensation? 
~ 2 A. You know, I take that back. Because a 
2 3 friend of mine had gotten into the insurance 
I 
14 business. His name was Steve Lloyd. I can't 
I 
2 5 remember if I did go through him or not to get my 
j 
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1 Workmen's Comp. He was with Hanley Insurance. 
2 And I can't remember whether or not I went 
3 through him or not. So, honestly, I can't 
4 remember that question. My bills come directly 
5 from you. Or from the State Insurance Fund. So 
6 I don't know. 
7 Q. But if you used him it would have been 
8 back in '92, I assume? 
9 A. Like I said, ifJ did go with him. I 
0 don't know ifl had ever changed anything there 
1 or not. I don't know. 
2 Q. Do you know if he is still an insurance 
3 agent in the Boise area? 
4 A. Steve Lloyd? I know the Hartley 
5 Insurance firm is still there. He does a lot of 
6 things. Bu~ I don't think he is still in the 
7 insurance business. 
8 Q. And the Hartley Insurance that you are 
9 referencing, where is that located? 
0 A. On Overland Road. 
1 Q. With respect to your aJlegations in 
2 this case, there is some general questions I want 
3 to ask. And then we'll go through the complaint. 
4 You are certainly not contending that the State 





Q. And, as I understand it, you don't lmow 
4 who makes the decisions with respect to 
5 dividends? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. And as I also understand it you do 
8 not - well, let me ask it this way. Would you 
9 agree that one of the purposes of the State 
0 Insurance Fund is to provide Workers' 
1 Compensation insurance to Idaho employers such as 
2 yourself? 
3 MR. LOJEK: And rl1 object to the 
· 4 extent that it calls for a legal conclusion and a 
5 statutory interpretation. And it is really one 
; 6 of the issues in this case to be d~cided by the 
judge. Again, we are not calling this witness, 
8 or this client, or this plaintiff as an expert in 
9 this case. And I think these questions go to his 
1o 
! 
expertise in the insurance business or his 
¥1 interpretation of the statutes as to which he has 
i 
2 2 none. He doesn't have any knowledge of the 
2 3 statutes and how they relate. And, obviously, 
I 
' ? 4 that is a contested issue between the State 
i 
I 
.2 5 Insurance Fund and something that the lawyers 
! 
i 
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1 have talked about. And I think the judge will 
2 have to make a conclusion. So that is my 
3 objection. I'm sorry to be so wordy. I just 
4 don't understand how this is within the scope of 
5 Rule 26. I really don't. 
6 MS. DUKE: Rule 30 is also applicable. 
7 But, regardless. If you could read the question 




THE WITNESS: Go ahead. 
(Record read.) 
THE W11NESS: I believe that is what 
2 they do. Provide Workers' Comp. 
3 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And you obviously want 
4 it to be a company that is arow,d and able to pay 
5 your losses, if you have losses; correct? 
6 A. Sure, I want the State Insurance Fund 
7 to be around. 
8 Q. Do you know what the Idaho Insurance 
9 Guarantee Association is? 




Q. Do you know what it is? 
A . No. 
Q. Do you know if the State Insurance Fund 
4 is a member of the Idaho Guarantee Association? 
5 A. I do not know. 
1 Q. Do you have any w,derstanding of what 
2 the costs are to administer a policy that is 
3 under $2,500 versus the cost of a policy that is 
4 over $2,500? 
5 MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the question 
6 as being vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. You 
7 may answer. 
8 THE WITNESS: I'm not in the insurance 
9 business. I don't know. 
0 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) You certainly understand 
1 that you as a policyholder, and we'll just use 
2 your average of $1,600 for premiums this year, 
3 that you as a policyholder with a premium of 
4 approximately $1,600 this year, have the same 
~ 
6
5 rights to coverage as does any other 
f policyholder? 
f7 MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the extent 
1: 
that it asks for a legal conclusion. You may 
answer. 
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
f 1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have any 
2 2 understanding as to how many policies the State 
f 3 Insurance Fund has that are under $2,500? 
A. I couldn't tell you how many policies 
f 5 they have. 
Page 51 ! 
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Q. Or how many that are over $2,500? 
A. I couldn't tell you how many. 
Q. What led you to bring this lawsuit? 
A. You know, I had called the State 
5 Insurance Company, I don't know, a couple years 
6 ago when I wasn't getting dividends anymore. I'm 
7 like, "What's up with this? I don't get a 
9 dividend because I don't pay over $2,500?" 
9 Basically they told me, "Yeah, that's right." 
O That was was kind of it 
1 And then my girlfriend, she's a 
2 hairstylist, she was cutting -- what's his name? 
3 Phil Gordon's hair. And he was kind of telling 
4 her about this case with the State Insurance 
5 Fund. And she goes, "My boyfriend wants to talk 
6 to you." And so she called me up real quick. 
7 And I kind of talked to him and set up an 
8 appointment with him. And it just kind of went 
9 from there. I mean, it is basically pretty 
O simple. 
1 MR. LOJEK: You have answered the 
2 question. I don't want you to go into any 
3 conversations between you and Mr. Gordon. 
4 
5 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MS. DUKE: And I'm not going there at 
E'age 
1 all. 
2 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What is your 










A. Her name is Donna Bond. 
Q. And what is her address? 
A. Home address? Shop address? 
Q. Home address. 
A. 2437 Laughridge. 
Q. Boise? 
A. Meridian. 
Q. And where does she work? 
A. She owns Bond and Company. 
Q. Is that a hair salon? 
A. It is. 
Q. And where is it located? 
A. 5819 Overland. 
Q. And so, as I understand it, what 
8 prompted you to bring th.is lawsuit, it sounds 
9 like, was a conversation that your girlfriend had 
f O had with Mr. Gordon? 
1 MR. LOJEK: I think that has been asked 
2 and answered. Could you read the question back, 
3 please. 
4 (Record read.) 
MR. LOJEK: You can answer that. 
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l THE WITNESS: That's how things got 
2 started. 
3 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And do you rec al I about 
4 when this was? I mean, obviously you probably 
5 don't recall the exact date. But month and year? 
6 Or season and year? 
7 A. You know, I couldn't tell you the year. 
8 It had to be at least a year ago. Yeah, it was 
9 probably back in there. 1 couldn't tell you what 
0 month. It possibly was in the swnmer. But, 
1 honestly, I couldn't tell you. It was a while 
2 ago. 
3 Q. Has your girlfriend been involved in 
4 any of the meetings and conversations that you 





Q. She hasn't been present at those? 
A. No. 
9 Q. Have you discussed with your girlfriend 
O anything that you and your attorneys have 
1 discussed regarding this case? 
2 A. As far as a discussion? I mean, 
3 general. She basically knows what the case is 
4 about and that is about it. 
















have any idea who Mr. Gordon was? 
A. I knew who he was just through her. 
Q. But I would assume it wasn't that you 
were like a friend or an acquaintance of his? 
A. No. 
Q. And then Mr. Lojek or Mr. Bistline, did 
you know either of them prior to this lawsuit? 
A. No. 
Q. You indicated that when you first 
learned that you were no longer receiving a 
dividend that you made a call to the State 
Insurance Fund. 
A. I didn't say when I first learned. 
Q. Okay. When did you first learn that 
5 you were no longer receiving a dividend? 
6 A. I couldn't tell you the exact date . I 
7 mean, obviously, I got a letter in the mail that 
8 said, "Your premiwn --" or it said something 
like, "Due to your premium not being in excess of 
$2,500 you won't be receiving a dividend." 
Q. But you don't know the year you 
received that letter? 
A. Without looking it up, no. 
Q. When was the first time that you 
contacted the State Insurance Fund with respect 
Page 56 
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1 to the.decision not to provide dividends to 
2 policyholders with premiwns of $2,500 or less? 
3 A. When was the first time I contacted 




A. I already told you I didn't know the 
7 exact date. 
8 Q. I understand. But I'm just trying to 
9 get -- was it within a couple months receiving 
0 the letter indicating that you wouldn't be 
1 receiving a dividend? 
2 A. I already told you I don't remember. I 
3 might have called them that day and said, "What 






Q. Who did you-talk to? 
A. I already told you I can't remember. 
Q. And what was said? 
A . For me to quote something would be --
0 basically it was -- I mean, I couldn't tell you 
1 exactly what was said. It was basicaJly what was 
2 written in the letter. "Your premium is not 
3 $2,500. You won't be getting a dividend. That's 
4 the way it is. 11 
S Q. Anything else you recall being 
1 discussed in that conversation? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Did you ever call the State Insurance 
4 Fund again with respect to a dividend after that 




A. I believe I did. 
Q. How many other times? 
A. I couldn't tell you. Not more than --
9 I didn't call more than a couple times. 
· o Q. And for those other conversations, any 






Q. Any idea who you spoke to? 
A. No. 
Q. And with respect to those couple times, 
· 6 other than the one we have talked about, ~at was 
7 the general content of the conversation? 
8 
9 
A. Say that again? 
Q. What was the general content of the 
O conversation, as best you can recall? 
fl A. Obviously, it was about why rm not 
I 




Q. But I'm asking for your recollection as 
to any details related to that. And what was 
said between you and whomever you spoke to at the 
I 
! 
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1 State Insurance Fund. 
2 A. No details. As far as I know, there 
3 weren't any details about that. 
4 Q. Was it basically the same type of 
5 conversation that we have already gone through? 
6 A. It was, 11You didn't pay $2,500. You 
7 are not getting a dividend." 
8 Q. Why did you stay with the State 
a-----------,--
1 it hasn't happened. 




A. I believe so, yes .. 
Q. Other than talking to it sounds like 
6 some other policyholders who you can't recall any 
7 of the names of, and your girlfriend, and 
8 obviously excluding what you have talked to your 
9 Insurance Fund after you were no longer receiving 9 attorneys about, have you spoken to anyone else 
O a dividend? O about the State Insurance Fund's dividend policy? 
1 A. I'm busy at work. I don't have time to 
2 play with swindling insurances and all of that 
3 other good stuff. I mean, it's required. I have 
4 employees. It is just the way it is. 
5 Q. And so you haven't looked around at any 
6 other options that are out there for your 
7 Workers' Compensation insurance needs after 
8 finding--
9 A. Why should I have to? 
O Q. -- after finding out you were not 
1 receiving a dividend? 
2 A. Why should I have to? 
3 Q. So is the answer "no"'? 
4 A. I figured some day you would probably 
5 come around and start giving dividends back. But 
Page 59 
1 A. You are asking me ifl can name a name? 
} 2 Is that what you are asking me? 
t3 Q. No. Jin asking you, first of all, if 
t 4 there is anyone, other than conversations you 
t 5 have relayed to us with the State Insurance Fund, 
i 6 other than your attorneys, other than your 
}7 girlfriend, and other than these other 




A. That's ridiculous. How many people 
~1 ; have you spoken to? You are starting to talk 
i 
f 2 down to me. I don't like that. 
1 
2 3 Q. I'm not. I'm just trying to understand 
I 
2 4 if you have spoken to anyone, other than those 
l 
2 5 individuals, about your case against the State 
Page 60 
30 (Pages 59 to 60) 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000235 
1 Insurance Fund or your position with respect to 
2 the State Insurance Fund's distribution of 
3 dividends? 
4 A. As far as I know, no. 
5 Q. Do you have a recording of your 
6 conversations with the State Insurance Fund? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Why do you believe that you are 
9 entitled to a dividend from the State Insurance 
0 Fund? 
1 MR. LOJEK: To the extent that asks for 
2 a legal conclusion, and a statutory 
3 interpretation, I'll object to the question. 
4 You may answer. 
5 THE WITNESS: If I paid $2,50 I would I 
6 get a dividend back'? According to the letter, 
7 yes . If I paid $2,400, would I get one back? 
8 According to the letter, no. It's not right. I 
9 don't expect to get paid -- if some guy gets 
O $1,000 - say, my premium is $100 and his is 
1 $1,000. I don't expect to get as much as him. I 
2 expect to get ten times less than him. It is not 
3 unreasonable. Who made the $2,500 rule? I 
4 didn't make it. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Why do you say it is not 
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1 right? 
2 A. It's not right. How can you even think 
3 it is right? 
4 Q. I'm asking you what your basis is for 
5 saying it is not right. 
6 A. If one person is getting a dividend, 
7 why shouldn't everyone down the line get a 
8 dividend? l mean. I can see ifl had accidents. 
9 I mean, sure, they are going to take that off. 
0 But that is not the case. 
1 Q. And so with respect to that you would 
2 certainly agree that if you have a $1,600 policy, 
3 and you have losses on that policy, that, you 
4 know, those should certainly be reduced from any 
5 dividend you would receive? 
· 6 ~ LOJEK: I object to the question 
' 
7 being vague, overbroad, and calling for a legal 
8 conclusion. You may answer. 
THE WITNESS: rm sure that has been 
done in the past. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And as I understand what 
you just said that is not something you disagree 
with; is that correct? 
MR. LOJEK: I'll object, because you 
2 5 are asking for an expert opinion. And he is not 
Page 62 
31 (Pages 61 to 62) 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
000236 
1 an expert in the insurance business. You are 
2 asking for a legal conclusion . He is not a 
3 lawyer. So those are the reasons for my 
4 objection. And whatever his response is, it 
5 seems to me as inconsequential. You may answer. 
6 THE WITNESS: I believe - I mean, I 
7 don't have a problem with them taking -- like one 
8 of my guys had an accident. Your safety rating 
9 at work. In my opinion, we have a great safety 
0 rating. I mean, two minor cuts in - well, we 
1 have been in business for 25, 26 years. Two 
2 minor cuts in 26 years? In my opinion, that is a 
3 great record. 
4 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) But the question was, 
5 you certainly are not, from your position here as 
6 the one bringing the lawsuit, stating that you 
7 have any issue with respect to the State 
8 Insurance Fund taking into consideration losses 
9 as they relate to dividends; correct? 
0 MR. LOJEK: I'll have the same 
1 objections. The statute governing the State 
2 Insurance Fund covers the conduct of the State 
3 Insurance Fund. And it isn't up to this witness 
4 to say what that conduct should or should not be. 
5 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Is that correct? 
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1 A. I would have to say we would have to 
2 look at each particular company. 
3 Q. And that is not something that you're 
4 critical of them doing; correct? 
5 lvfR_ LOJEK: I have the same objection. 
6 This witness has no foundation to be or not to be 
7 critical. 
8 THE WITNESS: That rm not critical of 
9 them looking at my particular company? 
0 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Looking at any companies 
1 with respect to their losses and looking to those 
1 2 losses to determine what a potential dividend may 
1 3 or may not be? 
· 4 MR LOJEK: I'll have the same 
f 5 objection, if that is a question. 
· 6 THE WITNESS: Well, they are obviously 
, 7 not doing a very good job looking at each 
8 particular company if they won't even reduce 
9 my -- I don't even know what you call it. Rate 
IO per hundred. On my business. I can't get 
~ 1 anybody to do it. I can't get anybody to have a 
I 
~ 2 new category in there. 
i 
i 
~ 3 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) But what I'm getting to, 
¥ 4 and what I'm asking about is, is not whether you 
2 5 are satisfied with the category you have been jn 
I 
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1 for the past several years. But, instead, with 
2 respect to losses, you are certainly not critical 
3 of the State Insurance Fund looking at a 
4 company's losses to evaluate a potential 
5 dividend; correct? 
6 MR. LOJEK: I'll repeat my objection. 
7 You may answer. 
8 THE WITNESS: I would imagine that is 
9 how insurance companies work; don't they? They 
0 look at your losses and figure out your rate. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So you would agree that 
2 is not something that you are critical of? 
3 MR. LOJEK: I have the same objection. 
4 This witness is not in a position to be or not to 
5 be critical of the State ofldaho's statutes 
6 governing the State lnsurance Fund. 
7 THE WITNESS: I would agree. 
8 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you read the 
9 affidavit of James Alcorn in this case? 
0 A. I don't believe I have. 
1 Q. And let me ask it this way. Have you 
2 read anything that has been created by the State 
3 Insurance Fund related to this lawsuit as to the 
4 
5 
1 or less? 
12 MR LOJEK: I'll object to that 
3 question. Because, as you know, Ms. Duke, we 
4 have been waiting, and waiting, and waiting for 
5 answers to discovery requests. And they are 
6 still not complete at this point in time. And 
7 even this morning we just received a big stack of 
8 infonnation that I haven't even read. When the 
9 State of Idaho State Insurance Fund has responded 
O to the discovery requests, at that time my 
1 clients will be reviewing the infonnation. But 










You may answer. 
MS. DUKE: And, l guess, for the 
record. We answered them within the time frame 
allotted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
There has been other items provided over the last 
year. 
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you reviewed 
anything from the State Insurance Fund as to its 
explanation for the policy that dividends will 
f 2 not be issued to policyholders of $2,500 or less 
i 






A. I don't believe I have. 
Q. As you sit here today do you have any 
reasoning behind why the State Insurance FWld 
does not pay dividends to policyholders of $2,500 
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1 understanding as to why the State Insurance ·Fund 
2 has not issued or provided dividends to 
3 policyholders of $2,500 or less over the last 
4 couple of years? 
5 MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the question 
6 to the extent it caHs for a legal conclusion. 
7 And a statutory interpretation. 
8 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) I'm just asking for your 
9 understanding. 
0 A. As far as I understand it, the state 
1 statute says that they should pay all of the 
2 policyholders. Now, if you are not going to pay 
3 all of the policyholders, then go change the 
4 statute. 
5 Q. But my question was, do you have any 
6 understanding as to the State Insurance Fund's 
7 rationale? 
8 MR. LOJEK: Same objection. 
9 THE WITNESS: I have no understanding 
0 of the rationale. 
1 Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you mind ifwe take 
2 about a five-minute break? 
3 MR. LOJEK: I don't mind. I've got a 
4 noon meeting. I didn't anticipate this wouJd go 
5 more than two hours. CouJd I suggest that we 
I 
i 
l ac!Journ over the noon hour and come back at l :00? 
2 MS. DUKE: I don't have that much more. 
3 MR. LOJEK: I still have a noon 
4 meeting. 
5 MS.DUKE: We have had this scheduled 
6 for a month. Mr. Bistline is here. 
7 MR. LOJEK: That's true. Why don't you 




Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Mr. Becker, do you have 
an understanding as to certain costs that you 
could be responsible for in the event you do not 
prevail in this case against the State Insurance 
Fund? 
MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the 
question. Because I think it is an attempt to 
intimidate this witness. I think you are 
harassing at this point. You are threatening 
that he is going to be in deep financial trouble 
if this lawsuit is not successful. And I'm going 





MS. DUKE: Well, we disagree. And, if 






court. But I have nothing further. 
MR. LOJEK: And we have no questions at 
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CERTIFICATE OF WITNESS 
I, SCOTT ALAN BECKER, being first duly 
3 sworn, depose and say: 
4 That I am the witness named in the foregoing 
5 deposition, consisting of pages l through 69; 
6 that I have read said deposition and know the 
7 contents thereof; that the questions contained 
8 therein were propounded to me; and that the 
9 answers contained therein are true and correct, 
O except for any changes that I may have listed on 
1 the Change Sheet attached hereto: 
DATED this __ day of ___ _, 2007. 
SCOTT ALAN BECKER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
day of _______ __;,2007. 
NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR -------
RESIDING AT ________ _ 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES ------
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1 ERRATA SHEET FOR SCOTT ALAN BECKER 
2 Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
Reads ______ _______ _ 
3 Should Read ____________ _ 
4 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
5 Reads _______________ _ 
Should Read _____________ _ 
6 
7 Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
Reads _______________ _ 
8 Should Read _____________ _ 
9 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
10 Reads _______________ _ 
Should Read _____________ _ 
1 
12 Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
Reads _______________ _ 
1 3 Should Read _____________ _ 
14 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
15 R~~----------------
Should Read _____________ _ 
16 
1 7 Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
Reads _______________ _ 





Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ __ _ 
R~~----------------
Should Read _______ ______ _ 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ____ _ 
Reads _ _ _ _ ___________ _ 
Should Read _ ____________ _ 
You may use another sheet if you need more room. 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I, MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR No. 4 71, 
3 Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify: 
4 That the foregoing proceedings were taken 
5 before me at the time and place therein set 
6 forth. at which time the witness was put under 
7 oath by me; 
B That the testimony and all objections made 
9 were recorded stenographic.ally by me and 
0 transcribed by me or under my direction; 
1 That the foregoing is a true and correct 
2 record of all testimony gjven, to the best of my 
3 ability; 
4 I further certify that I am not a relative 
s or employee of any attorney or party, nor am I 
6 financially interested in the action. 
7 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal 









MON1CA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 
Notary Public 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7877 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDATION OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
BIFURCATION OF CLASS 
COME NOW the defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of 
the State Insurance Fund, and the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and 
through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby submit this 
opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class, 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDA TION OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR BIFURCATION OF CLASS- I 
000242 
filed December 4, 2009 ("plaintiffs' Motion"). As explained herein, plaintiffs' requested 
reconsideration and bifurcation should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Motion seeks relief from this Court's prior decision regarding the applicable 
statute of limitations in this matter. In particular, this Court's Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Statute of Limitation, filed April 30, 2007 
("Order"), provided that "Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action accruing prior to July 21, 2003, 
are TIME-BARRED, based upon the applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations." Id. 
at 2. 
Plaintiffs have now taken the curious position that "this is not a statutory cause of action 
but, rather, is grounded in contract[.]" Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
and Alternative Motion to Bifurcate, filed December 3, 2009 ("plaintiffs' Memo"), at 4. 
Plaintiffs obliquely point to the depositions of plaintiffs Farber and Becker, pointing out that 
both individuals discussed their SIF policies during their depositions. Plaintiffs also assert that 
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Farber "made clear that the Plaintiffs and the Class have a 
direct, contractual property interest in those dividend monies which were improperly distributed 
by the SIF." In doing so, plaintiffs ignore that the insurance contract each policyholder has with 
SIF does not discuss a dividend or the policyholder's right thereto. In addition, in making their 
request, plaintiffs are effectively requesting this Court reject the Idaho Supreme Court's finding 
in Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005), 
wherein the Court held that claims based on statutory violations are subject to a three year statute 
of limitation. As discussed below, these contentions should be rejected by the Court. 
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A. The Hayden Lake decision establishes a 3-year statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims. 
Plaintiffs note that the Idaho Supreme Court held in Hayden Lake that: "Thus, since the 
claims would not exist 'but for' the statutes, the [ district] court applied the three-year statute of 
limitations to contract claims and determined that the claims accrued on the effective date of the 
leases." Plaintiffs' Memo at 6 (quoting Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 395.) Despite this, plaintiffs 
claim that this case is different, asserting that the policyholders' claim to a pro rata portion of the 
dividends results in an action wherein the gravamen lies in contract, rather than statute. See 
Plaintiffs' Memo at 8 ("The claims involved here are intimately and directly involved with the 
operation of a contract."). Tellingly, plaintiffs cite no contract language within the policy in 
support of their assertions. 
The holding of Hayden Lake is clear on this point. Claims, the gravamen of which are 
based on statutory violations, are subject to a three year statute of limitation: 
There is no Idaho law directly on point as to whether the 3-year statute of 
limitations for statutory violations or the 5-year statute .for breach of contract 
applies when a contract incorporates a statute and the allegations stem from 
violations of those statutes. The district court's application of the three-year 
statute of imitations stemmed from its finding that the gravamen of HLFPD's 
claims were grounded in statute. 
In Kelso this Court held that Kelso's claims that the SIF "acted beyond its 
statutory authority" in real estate investments with the State survived a motion to 
dismiss. Id. at 140, 997 P .2d at 60 l. This holding was premised on this Court's 
determination that the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated into its contracts 
with its policyholders. Id. at 138, 997 P.2d at 599. This Court did not make any 
findings as to the statute of limitation that would apply to the claims. 
HLFPD's breach of contract and implied covenant claims are based on 
alleged statutory violations. The district court looked to Dietrich v. Copeland 
Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916), which held that the statute of 
limitation for a statutory liability applied, despite the fact that the case was 
brought as an action to collect on promissory notes. This Court reasoned that, "[a] 
'statutory liability' is one that depends for its existence on the enactment of the 
statute, and not on the contract of the parties." Id. at 318, 154 P. at 628 (quoting 4 
Words and Phrases, Second Series, 686). Though the district court recognized that 
Dietrich may not be controlling in light of this Court's Kelso decision, it stated 
that "[ Dietrich J is useful in support of the proposition that the true gravamen of 
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the plaintiffs' claims should control the question of which statute of limitations is 
applicable, rather than the manner in which the claims are actually pied." This 
conclusion is correct. 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 403-04, 111 P.3d 73, 88-89 (2004). In 
doing so, note that the Court specifically remarks that the Kelso court "did not make any 
findings as to the statute of limitations that would apply to the claims." Id at 404 (emphasis 
added). Thus, plaintiffs can find no refuge in Kelso for their argument that a 5-year statute 
applies. 1 
In addition to disregarding the holding in Hayden Lake, Plaintiffs' argument ignores two 
additional critical points. First, plaintiffs' change in position is belied both by their own 
language in the current governing complaint, and by their position on appeal. The First 
Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial asserts only three causes of action: 
Declaratory Relief - Payment of Dividends, Declaratory Relief - Injunction, and Damages. 
None assert a separate and distinct claim for breach of contract, and, in fact, plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint expressly intertwines a claimed violation of statute with references to contract: e.g., 
" ... such acts and actions are in derogation of the contractual and statutory provisions ... " (,r26); 
" ... acted wrongly, arbitrarily, in violation of an [sic J law of the State of Idaho and contrary to 
the contract ... " (if28.a); " ... acted in violation of Idaho law and the provision of the contract..." 
(if33); " ... did not have any lawful or contractual authority ... " (Prayer for Relief, if2). In fact, 
1 Interestingly, plaintiffs omit discussion of the other Hayden Lake decision, Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005). In that matter, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected SIF's request for 
attorney fees, holding that fees were not recoverable under either Idaho Code §41-1839 or Idaho Code §12-120(3), 
in light of the nature of the action. Id. at 313 ("Both Idaho case law and legislative history suggest subsection four 
does not apply to statutory-based litigation. Consequently, LC. §41-1839(4) does not bar recovery of attorney fees 
for the SIF under I.C. §12-120(3) .... However, where the gravamen ofa complaint regards a violation ofa statute 
rather than a contract or commercial transaction, LC. § 12-120(3) does not apply. The gravamen of HLFPD's 
complaint was whether the SIF violated its statutory obligations imposed by its workers' compensation insurance 
contracts. Consequently, the SIF is not entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees under LC. §12-120(3).") 
Plaintiffs' attempts to now recast this action as a straight contract action is likely motivated, in no small part, by the 
realization that plaintiffs lack a statutory basis for attorneys' fees. 
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Paragraph 8 expressly alleges that: "This statute provides the sole and exclusive authority 
under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends to its subscribers." Thus, 
plaintiffs' own Amended Complaint contradicts their new contention that "this is not a statutory 
cause of action[.]" 
Further, plaintiffs asserted in their Idaho Supreme Court briefing, bluntly, that "[t]his 
case involves the meaning of LC.§ 72-915," and that "[pJlaintiffs and the some 30,000 members 
of the class they represent have protested this conduct in light of LC. §72-915." Appellants' 
Brief at p. I. The sea-change in positions advance by plaintiffs now should be precluded as a 
matter of judicial estoppel: 
If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the trial of 
their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases be paralyzed; 
the coercive process of the law, available only between those who consented to its 
exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the rights of all men, honest and 
dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts, and consistency of proceeding is 
therefore required of all those who come or are brought before them. It may 
accordingly be laid down as a broad proposition that one who, without mistake 
induced by the opposite party, has taken a particular position deliberately in the 
course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose. 
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,153,937 P.2d 1222, 1227 (1997)(quoting Winmark v. Miles & 
Stockbridge, 109 Md. App. 149, 674 A.2d 73 (1996)). Thus, plaintiffs' argument should be 
rejected. 
Second, despite plaintiffs' attempts to characterize the Farber decision otherwise, the 
Supreme Court's holding is overwhelming addressed to interpretation of a statute, more than 
amply demonstrating that the gravamen of this action lies in statute, not contract: 
Instead, the plain language of I. C. § 72-915 demonstrates that the statute grants 
the Manager discretion to distribute a dividend when "there is an aggregate 
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry" and the 
Manager deems that the aggregate balance "may be safely and properly divided." 
The Manager's discretion is therefore limited to the decision of whether or not to 
distribute a dividend in the first place. The remainder of the sentence sets forth the 
method by which dividends are to be distributed, requiring the Manager to "credit 
to each individual member of such class" who has been a policyholder for at least 
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six months "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having 
regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates." Id The 
phrase "any class of employment or industry," when read with other statutes 
related to worker's compensation insurance, refers to the class to which each 
policyholder belongs for purposes of determining the rate paid for worker's 
compensation coverage. The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance 
proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to 
all paid premiums. To argue that this language could be construed to somehow 
grant discretion regarding how to calculate the distribution makes no sense, and 
would require this Court to stretch the plain language beyond its obvious 
meaning. Finally, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature passed House Bill No. 511, an 
appropriations bill, which casts further doubt on the Fund's proposed 
interpretation of LC. § 72-915. H.R. 511, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002). 
The bill provided that the Fund would distribute a specified amount to state 
agencies as policyholders, and that "[t]he balance of the dividends shall be 
credited to each individual agency proportionally in accordance with Section 72-
915, Idaho Code." Id This language demonstrates that in 2002, the Legislature 
viewed section 72-915 as requiring a pro rata distribution of dividends. 
Farber v. State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, _, 208 P.3d 289, 294 (2009). Thus, there is 
nothing in the Farber decision that indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court has reversed its 
holding in Hayden Lake, or otherwise held that the gravamen of plaintiffs' suit lay in contract, 
rather than statute. 
Plaintiffs attempt to sidestep these concerns by suggesting, in part, that there might be 
more than one gravamen to the action. Not only does this ignore the definition of 'gravamen,'2 
but also disregards that no such "multiple gravamen" conclusion was reached in Hayden Lake, 
even where claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
breach of fiduciary duty, money had and received, rescission, declaratory relief, injunction, 
equitable accounting, and attorney fees were made. See 141 Idaho at 393. In any event, 
plaintiffs cite no authority for their "multiple gravamen" theory. 
In a similar vein, plaintiffs also cite to James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708 (1986), as well as 
decisions from other states, for the proposition that where there are two applicable statutes of 
2 Black's 7th : "The substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint." 
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limitation, the longer should apply. However, plaintiffs' argument is not predicated on two 
alternative readings of a statute oflimitation as contained in a statute, as was the case in James v. 
Buck, where the Court was attempting to discern a statute of limitation set forth by Idaho Code 
§6-IOI l. l l l Idaho at 710 ("In addition, where two constructions of a statute oflimitations or a 
rule which impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, courts generally prefer the 
construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action. Our interpretation 
of J.C. §6-l 01 l today is consistent with that rule.")(internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs' 
argument is not predicated on discerning the longer of two statute of limitations that might arise 
out of a statute, but, rather, plaintiffs' attempts to abandon their statute-based claim and recast it 
as a pure breach of contract claim. As such, James v. Buck offers plaintiffs no refuge, and, for 
the other reasons as stated above, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied. 
Finally, note further, that plaintiffs extensively argued in favor of distinction of Hayden 
Lake in their prior opposition. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed on or about March 12, 2007, at pp. l l-16. Plaintiffs attempt to recast 
their second bite at the apple both via nonsensical citations to the affidavits of Farber and 
Becker, citation to the Idaho Supreme Court's Farber citation (without quotation), citation to one 
additional authority (James v. Buck, discussed above), and via attacks on the prior judge in this 
matter, Judge Morfitt. See Plaintiffs' Memo at p. 4 ("Following these two depositions and many 
pages of briefing, the Supreme Court on March 5th and May 5th made clear what was, perhaps, 
unclear to Judge Morfitt."), and at p. IO ("Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of the 
issues discussed above. Judge Morfitt apparently ignored the citation of the Plaintiffs to one case 
holding that a longer statute of limitation should be applied where there is a choice between a 
longer statute and a shorter statute."). Plaintiffs even go so far as to improperly suggest that 
"this issue was not really fleshed out for Judge Morfitt," ignoring that I) it was raised in 
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defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) plaintiffs spent several pages responding to it in 
their opposition, utilizing many of the same arguments as now made, and 3) plaintiffs' arguments 
were responded to in an additional 2 pages of briefing in SIF's reply memorandum.3 In short, 
plaintiffs arguments now are as unavailing as previously made, and plaintiffs' 'new' arguments 
on reconsideration do not warrant reversal of the previous decision of the Court. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied. 
B. Plaintiffs' Alternative Motion for bifurcation should be denied. 
In the alternative, plaintiffs request that "the Court bifurcate the existing Class into two 
sub-classes," one of which would be for employers who purchased a policy between July I, 1999 
and June 30, 200 I, and the second class being those employers who purchased a policy between 
July I, 200 I to some unspecified date in the future. Plaintiffs' Memo at I 0-l l. 
As an initial matter, plaintiffs' argument wholly disregards the current class actually at 
issue in this litigation. In defining the current class, the Court issued its Order defining the class 
as follows: 
All persons or entities, other than Lojek Law Offices Chtd. and Gordon Law 
Offices Chtd., who: 
a. purchased a policy for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF 
on or after July I, 2000; 
b. paid an annual premium for such insurance to the SIF which was equal 
to or less than $2,500.00 for one or more policy years beginning on or 
after July I, 2000; and 
c. did not receive a dividend since July 22, 200 I, from the SIF solely 
because he, she, or it paid a premium of $2,500.00 or less during any 
respective subsequent year that dividends were paid to other 
policyholders. 
3 Indeed, plaintiffs' reference to the length of SIF's argument in its opening memorandum - without reference to 
plaintiffs' own opposition briefing and SIF's reply briefing - in arguing that the matter was not "fleshed out'' for 
Judge Morfitt borders on misrepresentation by omission. 
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Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, at 2. Further, as a result of the Idaho State 
Legislature's repeal of Idaho Code §72-915, as made by S.B. 1166 as effective May 6, 2009, the 
class (looking forward) was expressly 'frozen' to the class in existence at the time of the repeal.: 
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this at shall not apply 
to any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or 
before December 31, 2008, and the provisions of this at shall not apply to the 
aforementioned case of Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently 
pending with respect to those policy holders paying annual premiums of not more 
than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
(emphasis added). Thus, the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 precludes any claims for dividends 
declared after May 6, 2009. Thus, plaintiffs' identified class in this motion - policyholders who 
purchased policies from July 1, 1999 to some unstated future date - is not an accurate 
representation of the actual extant class (thus, SIF does, in fact, dispute plaintiffs' contention that 
"the composition of the Class is not in dispute"). In actuality, the dividend periods at issue in 
this action are as follows: 
Dividend Period Dividend Declaration Dividend Paid 
7/1/01-6/30/02 Dec. 2003 Jan. 2004 
7/1/02-6/30/03 Dec. 2004 Jan. 2005 
7 /1/03-6/30/04 Dec. 2005 Jan. 2006 
7 /l /04-6/30/05 Dec. 2006 Dec. 2006 
7 /l /05-6/30/06 Dec. 2007 Jan.2008 
7/1/06-6/30/07 Dec. 2008 Jan.2009 
(See, e.g., Affidavit of John Marshall, filed Dec. 4, 2009, Exh. A.) 
It is for this same reason that plaintiffs' request for bifurcation ultimately fails. In light of 
the Court's ruling on the statute of limitations, plaintiffs' requested "Sub-Class # 1" - employers 
who purchased a policy between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2001 - are not presently a party to 
this action. Thus, as these policyholders are not members of the extant class in this action, there 
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is nothing to 'bifurcate.' To the extent plaintiffs now seek to challenge the Court's ruling on the 
issue of the applicable statute of limitations, the appropriate means for requesting relief would be 
either through a request for reconsideration (which should be denied, as above) or via appeal to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Indeed, plaintiffs' Motion appears to suggest that they intend to seek 
relatively immediate appeal with respect to "Sub-Class #1," so it is unclear why plaintiffs have 
not sought a Rule 54(b) certificate.4 
In any event, plaintiffs' claimed interest in "expediting" a decision on this issue via 
bifurcation rings hollow, given that plaintiffs took no action to seek reconsideration or review of 
the Court's April 30, 2007 Order for over two and a half years. Indeed, plaintiffs could have 
immediately sought reconsideration after such decision to, e.g., cite the James v. Buck decision 
( a 1986 decision) they now claim is critical to their Motion; plaintiffs could have sought 
reconsideration after the depositions of Farber (June 29, 2007) or Becker (June 28, 2007)5 which 
they also now claim are critical to consideration of the Motion; plaintiffs could have sought a 
Rule 54(b) certificate after the issuance of the Court's Order on April 30, 2007; plaintiffs could 
have sought a Rule 54(b) certificate in conjunction with their previously requested (and granted) 
request for interlocutory appeal, filed on January 4, 2008; and plaintiffs could have sought 
reconsideration following the May 5, 2009 decision in Farber. As such, this Court should pay 
little heed to plaintiffs' references to allowing "Sub-Class #1" to "proceed to appeal without 
delay" and "expediting a resolution of the claims of Sub-Class #2," as plaintiffs failed to 
previously avail themselves to reconsideration/review of the statute of limitation ruling, and as 
resolution of such claims is not impaired by the absence of "Sub-Class# 1" in this action. 
4 Of course, in noting this, SIF still reserves all right to dispute and contest any such request for a Rule 54(b) 
certificate on the statute of limitations issue, if such request is ultimately made by plaintiffs. 
5 Plaintiffs' Motion omits the dates of these depositions. 
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Finally, plaintiffs' request should also be denied on the grounds of judicial economy. 
Plaintiffs' proposed bifurcation would not simplify this matter, but would instead unnecessarily 
complicate the action by effectively creating two separate actions which the parties would have 
to address simultaneously. For example, plaintiffs' apparent intent would be seek appeal of the 
exclusion of "Sub-Class #1" from this action, which would occur during the pendency of this 
action as currently postured, placing this action (as well as the parties' counsel) in two different 
courts at the same time on the same case. Such a scenario runs contrary to the goals of judicial 
economy. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for bifurcation should also be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or, 
Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class should be denied. 
Oral argument is requested. 
RESPECTUFLL Y SUBMITTED this :t._ day of January, 2010. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P. 
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APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
The State Insurance Fund (SIF) in its responsive memorandum to Plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration has not really addressed Plaintiffs' principal argument. That argument, simply 
stated, is that Plaintiffs could not proceed in this case based on a statute alone. Even more 
simply put, LC. § 72-915 does not give every employer in Idaho any right to anything. It is only 
when the employer has a contract with the SIF that LC. § 72-915 becomes operative and of 
importance. An employer cannot bring a statutory cause of action alleging a violation of LC. § 
72-915 without a contract being formed between that employer and the SIF. 
Because the statutory framework of the worker's compensation system in Idaho is 
incorporated into the contract of insurance between an Idaho employer and the SIF, the contract 
is thus expanded to bring within its four comers that statutory framework including, among other 
rights and privileges, the pro rata requirement of I.C. § 72-915 when a dividend corpus is 
distributed. to the SIF's policyholders as a "readjustment" of the "rate" on which their premium 
was based (effectively a premium refund). 
If this were simply a statutory cause of action where a statute - and nothing more -
allowed a direct cause of action against the SIF, Plaintiffs would then readily agree and indeed 
must agree with the Defendants' position on the application of a three-year limitation. But that is 
not the case and the matter is not quite as simple or as simplistic as Defendants seem to believe. 
These are the same Defendants who have not denied, refuted or even discussed Plaintiffs' central 
and most basic point: the statute in question confers no rights and no benefits and no privileges 
on any Idaho employer unless and until that employer has a contract of insurance with the SIF. 
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The contract is not then incorporated into the statute. On the contrary, the statute is incorporated 
into the contract. It becomes a part of the substance and material provisions of the contract. 
This is manifestly clear from Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 
997 P.2d 591 (2000). " ... the contract [of insurance] necessarily incorporates the statutory 
framework in which both created the SIF and governs the actions that can be taken by the SIF 
with regard to the SIF's funds ... consequently, any act taken by the SIF beyond its statutory 
authority would also be a breach of the SIF' s contract with Kelso." 
In addition to the mere presence of a contract, this case really goes to the heart of the 
contracts between the SIF and the policyholders in the Class. That is to say, the pro rata 
distribution of the dividend corpus really is an adjustment of the consideration lying at the heart 
of the contract. The premium paid by the policyholder is consideration for the SIF's agreement 
to underwrite a risk subject, of course, to the statutory framework. When the dividend corpus is 
distributed on a pro rata basis, that is a readjustment of the rate charged by the SIF or a 
readjustment of the consideration. Clearly this is a contractual process. 
The very most that can be said by the Defendants is that the Plaintiffs' cause of action 
stands on two legs: one leg is the contract and the other is the statute which is, of course, a part 
of the contract We know a contract breach is governed by a five-year statute of limitations (I.C. 
§ 5-216) and that a pure statutory violation is under a three-year statute of limitations (I.C. §5-
219(3)). If there is a choice between the two limitation periods (which is not conceded by 
Plaintiffs here) that still brings into play James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 710, 727 P.2d 1136 
(1986) holding that where there is a choice between two statutes of limitation courts should 
generally prefer the construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action. 
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As pointed out in Plaintiffs' opening memorandum, this Idaho holding is consistent with the 
holdings of our sister states in Colorado, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota to 
name a few. 
To say that Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of these questions is not at all 
disrespectful of Judge Morfitt. It is simply a reflection of the fact that Judge Morfitt did not 
address these questions. His Order filed very early in this case's life applied a three-year statute 
of limitations and is of record. It is attached to this memorandum for the convenience of the 
Court. Judge Morfitt did not address James v. Buck which reflects Idaho law that a longer statute 
of limitations should be applied when there is a choice. Admittedly, Judge Morfitt did not have 
James v. Buck cited to him by Plaintiffs. Rather, case law from Montana, Colorado, Arizona and 
the two Dakotas was cited.1 But this is an additional reason why the Motion for Reconsideration 
is properly before this Court based on new authority and new developments since 2007 when 
Judge Morfitt made his original decision which is being asked to be reconsidered here. 
It is not at all disrespectful of Judge Morfitt either as to his office or his person to point 
out that he did not have before him those matters that Plaintiffs have brought before the Court in 
this Motion for Reconsideration, among them the controlling decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court in this action. To imply otherwise is both unfair and unnecessary. 
Having avoided the heart of Plaintiffs' argument, the SIF offers some irrelevancies (e.g., 
the insurance contract does not discuss a dividend or the policyholder's right thereto), and then 
clings to the Hayden Lake decision, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) as applicable to the 
1Gust, et al. v. Prudenlial Ins. Co. of America, 898 P.ld 964, 968 (Mont 1995). "Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a 
presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitations should prevail if two statutes are arguably appllcable. • Aneco Ins. Co. v. 
Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). See, e.g., Traveler's Indemnity Co. V. Anderson, 983 P.2d 999,1002 (Ariz. 
1999); Global Financial Selvices, Inc. v. Duttenhefuer, 575 N.W.2d 667,670 (N.D. 1998); Zoss v. Schllfers, 598 N.W.2d 550,553 
(S.D. 1999). 
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instant case. The SIF states that Hayden Lake is really dispositive of the issue and urges this 
Court on the strength of Hayden Lake to uphold Judge Morfitt' s decision that a three-year statute 
of limitation is absolutely the correct statute of limitation to apply. 
The SIF is more than a little inaccurate in stating that the Plaintiffs are "disregarding the 
holding in Hayden Lake" (Defendants' Opposition, p. 4). The Plaintiffs addressed Hayden Lake 
fully and directly at pps. 6-9 of its opening memorandum in support of their motion for 
reconsideration. In truth, the SIF does not really appreciate ( or simply will not appreciate) the 
melding of the contractual aspects of this case with the statutory aspects. Defendants cite to the 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial and point out, 
accurately but without apparent comprehension, that the statute and the contractual obligations of 
the SIF are combined in paragraphs 26, 28 and 33 of the Complaint which, notwithstanding, is 
really only subject to notice requirements. 
Indeed, the prayer for relief in paragraph 2 of the First Amended Complaint does speak to 
both lawful and contractual authority and recognizes correctly that J.C.§ 72-915 does provide the 
"sole and exclusive authority under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends to 
its subscribers" which, in context, refers to the contract's statutory incorporation. The key word 
in that sentence though is "subscribers" because it is only the "subscribers," i.e., the 
policyholders of the SIF, who have contracts of insurance to whom or as to which the statute 
applies. 
This is why the Plaintiffs have stated that this case has to do with the operation of a 
j 
contract while Hayden Lake concerns itself with the operation of the State Insurance Fund. That 
is a distinction with a difference as reflected in the authorities cited and the analysis offered by 
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Plaintiffs in their opening memorandum. 
The Defendants' confusion (or apparent confusion) may stem from the merging of the 
Kelso and Hayden Lake cases. The reader of this memorandum is reminded that the Plaintiffs' 
complaint in Hayden Lake was filed while Kelso was still pending before the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court did comment in Hayden Lake that: "Thus, since the claims would not exist 
'but for' the statutes, the [district] court applied the three-year statute of limitations to contract 
claims and determined that the claims accrued on the effective dates of the leases." at 395. 
However, would it not be just as accurate to say that the Plaintiffs claims in this case would not 
exist "but for" the contract which incorporated the statutes? The difference between Hayden 
Lake and this action is explained below. 
As stated in Plaintiffs' opening memorandum, that difference is that the Ke/so/Hayden 
Lake claims arise from a dispute about three things bearing on the operation and management 
decisions of the SIF. First, a surplus retained by the SIF was alleged to be in excess of what was 
statutorily required by LC. § 72-911. Second, the complaint stated that the SIF was selling 
worker's compensation insurance at the artificially low premiums established by LC. § 41-
1612(2) and (3). Additionally, Hayden Lake discussed yet another claim that the SIF had entered 
into certain real estate leases which were a violation of three statutes, i.e., I.C. §§ 41-701, 72-902, 
and 72-912. Hayden Lake at 394; Kelso at 140. All of these claims were really critical of how 
the SIF was operating its business. None of the claims were based on a subscriber's right to 
receive a readjustment of the rate paid for the coverage which is a direct entitlement to money as 
to which the Plaintiffs had a property interest. 
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Clearly, these claims did not involve the direct contractual relationship between the SIF 
and its policyholders created by LC. § 72-915 or, for that matter, any direct contractual 
relationship. Here, the policyholders do have a direct property interest in dividends once they are 
declared and begun to be distributed by the SIF's Manager. In contract to this direct relationship 
and property interest, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake and Kelso held that the policyholders of 
the SIF did not have a property interest in the assets of the SIF. Again, that is a distinction with a 
difference: operation of the State Insurance Fund versus the operation of a 
contract or, more properly, the fulfillment of contractual duties to policyholders who have a 
property right as to their pro rata distribution of the declared dividend corpus. 
The multiple contracts held by the Class members in this case absolutely require a pro 
rata distribution of dividend monies to identifiable policyholders. There is a contractual right to 
a pro rata share of the dividend corpus and a property right as to monies due. Therefore, an 
application of Hayden Lake's holding depends upon an analysis of the connection between the 
statute or the contract as drivers of the appropriate statute of limitation. None of the statutes in 
Hayden Lake conferred any direct right or benefit on the plaintiffs. Here, because the statute 
does not stand alone, is incorporated into the contract of insurance, and that melding or 
combination produces a property right as to the Plaintiffs and their Class, Hayden Lake provides 
no authority for Defendants' position. 
The Defendants reliance upon the fact that the Supreme Court in Farber, et al. v. State 
Insurance Fund, et al. focused on the statute is really an attempt to view the Supreme Court's 
decision with heavy blinders. If, as Kelso says, the statute is a part of the contract, then looking 
at the statute is really only isolating on a part of the contract, isn't it? So we can play in a 
semantics sandbox and discuss whether there is one or two or no "gravamen" of the lawsuit but 
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that skirts the danger of approaching this case with similar heavy blinders. We must come full 
circle to the fact that I.C. § 72-915 confers no rights on Idaho employers until and unless those 
employers have a contract with the State Insurance Fund. At that point, the statute is within the 
written contract with respect to the requirement for a pro rata distribution of the dividend corpus. 
There is a melding of the two and that combination constitutes the gravamen of the cause of 
action. Since we have a combination of a substantive statute (three years) and its incorporating 
contract (five years) a longer limitation should prevail even if two statutes of limitation are 
arguably applicable. 
MOTION FOR BIFURCATION 
If the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' argument for the application of a five-year 
limitation statute, then the alternate motion for bifurcation is, in fact, something that would 
promote a resolution of the Class claims which Plaintiffs have described as "Sub-Class No. 2." 
The composition of this Class is not in dispute and the employers in this Class would encounter 
no further delay in payment to them. This would result in a savings to the State Insurance Fund 
since the interest accruing on the claims of Sub-Class No. 2 would cease as soon as the claims 
are paid. 
The SIF argues that Plaintiffs dragged their feet in not asking for a reconsideration of 
Judge Morfitt's opinion earlier. That is beside the point. The question is whether bifurcation 
should occur, not when. The Plaintiffs did not really have a cause of action upon which they 
could have gone forward until the Supreme Court's decision in Farber and because of 
preliminary rulings which were appealed. Yes, Plaintiffs could have sought a Rule 54(b) 
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certificate earlier but if one wraps themselves in the "economy of justice" mantle, then how 
would multiple appeals involving a much larger set of Plaintiffs in this case promote that 
concept? 
Judicial economy in this context should not mean that both Classes should remain stalled 
while an appeal is made to the Supreme Court as to the two-year Class dismissed by Judge 
Morfitt. As stated earlier, that outcome is disadvantageous to both the State Insurance Fund and 
to the members of the Class already determined as viable. A bifurcation would serve the 
interests of justice both as to economy and simplification of issues. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be granted 
and a five-year statute of limitation applied in this case. 
Alternatively, bifurcation would be an easy remedy which would promote payment to the 
members of the Class who are presently and unquestionably deserving of the payment of 
damages and allowing the questionable Class (if that is the Court's decision) to proceed to an 
appellate level for a further examination of which statute of limitation should apply. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR BIFURCATION OF CLASS - 9 
000262 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jJ_ day of January, 2010. 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
Byo~ ~~~ 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
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Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
Donald W. Lojek 
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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the Court 
for hearing on April 6, 2007. Plaintiffs appeared through their attorneys of record, Mr. 
Bruce S. Bistline, Mr. Phillip Gordon and Mr. Donald W. Lojek. Defendants appeared 
through their attorneys of record, Mr. Richard Hall and Ms. Keely E. Duke. 
The Court having fully and carefully considered the file and record in this case 
together with the briefing and memoranda submitted in support of and in opposition to 
the Defendants' motion, and the Court having orally announced its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the record, in open court, which findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are adopted herein, and 
Good Cause Appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the three-year statute of limitation issue, be, and is hereby 
GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' claims and 
causes of action accruing prior to July 21, 2003, are TIME-BARRED, based upon the 
applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations. 
DATED: APR 3 0 2007 JAMES C fv10RFITT 
James C. Morfitt 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE ISSUE OF STATUTE OF LTMTTATIQN 4 
000265 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Donald W. Lojek 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
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Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
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702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
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This matter came on for hearing before the Court on February 26, 2010 upon Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration, or, in the Alternative, Bifurcation of Class. The motion for 
reconsideration and the motion for bifurcation were both briefed, however, only the motion for 
reconsideration was argued during the February 26, 2010 hearing. Argument on the motion for 
bifurcation was reserved for a future date to be determined following resolution of the motion for 
reconsideration. Mr. Donald Lojek and Mr. Phil Gordon were present on behalf of the plaintiffs 
and Mr. Richard Hall and Ms. Keely Duke were present on behalf of the defendants. The Court has 
considered the oral arguments of counsel and the briefing submitted by the parties. The Court's 
memorandum opinion is set forth below. 
PROCEDURAL lllSTORY: 
On April 30, 2007, this Court entered its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Statute of Limitation wherein the Court held that the applicable statute of 
limitations is three-years. Further, that the Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action arising prior to 
July 21, 2003, were time-barred based upon the applicable statute of limitations for statutory 
violations, 3-years. The case was assigned to the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan on July 2, 2007. 
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration, or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class 
on December 4, 2009. Plaintiffs motion is brought pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) and Rule 54(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek relief from this Court's prior Order, filed April 
30, 2007, ("Order"). Plaintiffs argue that during the two and one-half years since Judge Morfitt's 
Order "it has become evidence that the parties are proceeding upon a contract cause of action rather 
than a statutory action." Plaintiffs' memo at 8. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the class they represent 
maintain that a 5-year rather than a 3-year statute of limitations should apply in this case from the 
date of the filing of the Complaint. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of a decision on an interlocutory 
order prior to the entry of a final judgment, or within fourteen (14) days of entry of the final 
judgment. An order is deemed interlocutory until entry of a final judgment or entry ofan I.R.C.P. 
54(b) certificate. Noreen v. Price Development Co. Ltd Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 820, 25 P.3d 
2 
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129, 133 (Ct. App. 2001). See also, Idaho First Nat'[ Bank v. David Steed & Assoc., Inc., 121 
Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992). In this case, no final judgment has been entered and the Plaintiffs 
timely filed the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) is a proper procedural 
avenue for Defendants to pursue their motion for reconsideration. 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) permits the court to revise an order or decision "at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties .... " 
Therefore, 1.R.C.P. 54(b) provides an alternative basis upon which the Court may revise its prior 
Order. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely within the court's 
discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 159 P.3d 937,942 (2007). Abuse of discretion 
is determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court "(I) correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 
760 (2007) (citation omitted). 
When faced with a motion for reconsideration, the court is directed to consider any new 
facts presented by the moving party that provide insight into the correctness of the order to be 
reconsidered. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 
103 7 ( 1990). It is the burden of the moving party seeking reconsideration to place those new 
facts before the court for reconsideration. Id. While a party may properly present new evidence 
on an I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration, the rule does not require new evidence and 
the lack of new evidence alone does not act as an automatic denial of the motion for 
reconsideration but a trial court acts within the bounds of its discretion in denying a motion for 
reconsideration when a moving party either fails to provide new evidence or fails to direct the 
court to evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. Johnson 
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472-473, 147 P.3d 100, 104-105 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56( c )~ see also West 
3 
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Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005). To withstand a 
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something 
more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. 
Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851,853, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986). 
In a motion for summary judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor 
of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party. West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 82, 106 P.3d at 409. Summary 
judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. Id. ( citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd 
o/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002)). 
A trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or 
resolve controverted factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 
P.2d 1063, 1065 (1983) (citations omitted). 
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on 
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). Facts in dispute cease to be ''material" facts when the plaintiff fails to 
establish a prima facie case. Id. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material fact," 
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322-323, 106 S. Ct 2548, 2552, 91 L.3d.2d 265 (1986)). 
Summary judgments should be granted with caution. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 
808 P.2d 876 (1991) (citations omitted). If the record contains conflicting inferences or 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Tue Court initially notes that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is 
squarely within the Court's discretion. See Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho at 166, 159 P.3d at 942. 
Further, that the burden is on the Plaintiff to either provide new evidence or direct the Court to 
evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. 
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Lambros, 143 Idaho at 472-473, 147 P.3d at 104-105. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 
cannot find that the Plaintiffs have met their burden. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' motion asks that the Court reconsider the April 30, 2007 Order 
regarding the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs maintain that since Judge Morfitt's 
Order entered April 30, 2007, that it has become evident that the parties are proceeding on a 
contract claim and that therefore a 5-year statute of limitations pursuant to I.C. § 5-216 applies to 
Plaintiffs' claims. In support of the motion, Plaintiffs argue, inter a/ia, that the case of Kelso v. 
Irwin, P.A. vs. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P .2d 591 (2000), supports a finding that 
the applicable statute of limitations in this case is 5-years; that the facts supporting the Court's 
decision in Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 
(2005), are easily distinguishable from the facts in this case because the claims in Hayden Lake 
were related to the operation of the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter "SIF"), whereas the claims 
in this case are intimately and directly involved with the operation of a contract; and, that there is 
not a single "gravamen" of this action, rather the contract and the statute are inextricably 
intertwined. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that where the court is faced with two applicable 
statutes of limitation, the court should prefer the longer of the two. Citing James v. Buck, 111 
Idaho 708, 727 P.2d 1136 (1986). 
The Defendants respond by arguing that the Court appropriately decided the motion 
regarding the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, that Plaintiffs are advancing the 
same arguments previously made; and that Plaintiffs' new arguments on reconsideration do not 
warrant reversal of the previous decision of the Court. The Defendants argue, inter a/ia, that 
Hayden Lake supports the imposition of a 3-year statute of limitations; that Plaintiffs' reliance on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Kelso is misplaced because the decision did not contain any 
findings regarding the applicable statute of limitations; that a claim for breach of contract is not 
included in the Complaint; that the multiple "gravamen" theory is unsupported by the law; and, 
that James v. Buck was predicated on two alternative readings of a statute of limitation as 
contained in a single statute and therefore inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
The Court entered its initial order on the applicable statute of limitations in April of 2007. 
Both Kelso and Hayden Lake had been decided by the Supreme Court and briefed by the parties 
5 
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prior to this Court's initial ruling on the matter. The Court finds that the reasoning and holding in 
Hayden Lake supports the Court's previous and present finding that the applicable statute of 
limitations is 3-years. Further, that although Plaintiffs argue that Kelso supports a 5-year statute 
of limitations, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake specifically noted that the "[Supreme] Court 
did not make any findings as to the statute of limitation that would apply to the [contract] claims" 
in Kelso. Hayden Lake, 131 Idaho at 404, 111 P.3d at 89. 
In Kelso, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing Kelso's causes 
of action for breach of contract based on an alleged violation of I.C. § 72-911. Kelso, 134 Idaho 
at 140, 997 P.2d at 601. This holding was premised on the Supreme Court's determination that 
the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated into its contracts with its policyholders. Id. at 138, 
997 P.2d at 599. The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded on the breach of 
contract causes of action. Kelso was later consolidated with Hayden Lake and the case was 
certified as a class action. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73. 
In Hayden Lake, the Supreme Court initially noted that Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
District's (HLFPD) "breach of contract and implied covenant claims are based on alleged 
statutory violations." Id. The Supreme Court further noted that "[t]here is no Idaho law directly 
on point as to whether a 3-year statute of limitations for statutory violations or the 5-year statute 
of limitations for breach of contract applies when a contract incorporates a statute and the 
allegations stem from violations of those statutes." Id. at 403-404, 111 P.3d at 88-89. 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's application of a 3-year statute of 
limitations to the breach of contract claims of Kelso and the HLFPD. The Supreme Court cited 
with approval the following language from the district court's memorandum opinion: 
The district court cited to Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 28 
Idaho 312, 318, 154 P. 626, 628 (1916), for the proposition that, 
for the purpose of determining the applicable statute of limitations, 
a "statutory liability ... is one that depends for its existence on the 
enactment of the statute and not on the contract of the parties." 
Though the court recognized that this holding was not controlling 
in light of this Court's finding in Kelso that the contracts 
incorporated the SIF's statutory framework, the court explained that 
Dietrich supported its determination that the gravamen of the 
claims, and not the pleadings, should dictate the appropriate 
limitations period. Thus, since the claims would not exist "but for" 
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the statutes, the court applied the 3-year statute of limitations to the 
contract claims and determined that the claims accrued on the 
effective dates of the leases. 
Hayden Lake,, 141 Idaho at 394-395, 111 PJd at 79 - 80. The Court finds that language 
to be equally applicable to the facts of this case. In this case, the Plaintiffs allege that SIF 
breached its contract with policyholders when it violated I.C. § 72-915. In Hayden Lake, the 
district court was faced with deciding which statute of limitations applied to breach of contract 
claims, the allegations of which stem from violations of a statute. The Supreme Court upheld the 
district court's application of a 3-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the analysis and 
reasoning of Hayden Lake supports a determination that a 3-year statute of limitations applies to 
the Plaintiffs' claims. 
The Plaintiffs argument that a 5-year statute of limitations is appropriate because the 
contract incorporates the statute and but for the contract, the statute would be inapplicable is not 
supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Hayden Lake. Kelso supports Plaintiffs' argument 
that the statute is incorporated into the contracts. However, Hayden Lake sets the applicable 
statute of limitations for such claims. Plaintiffs have filed a class action lawsuit premised on 
SIF's failure to distribute dividends in accordance with I.C. § 72-915. Count I of the 1st 
Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief - payment of dividends; Count II seeks declaratory 
relief - injunction; and Count III seeks damages.1 To the extent that Plaintiffs' cast this action as 
one for breach of contact, the Plaintiffs' contracts with the SIF incorporate the statute. However, 
but for the statute, the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to dividends per I.C. § 72-915. Therefore, 
the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims is the violation of I.C. § 72-915 and a 3-year statute of 
limitations applies to Plaintiffs' claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The burden is on the party seeking reconsideration to provide new evidence or direct the 
court to evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. The 
Plaintiffs have not met this burden. Therefore, 
1 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial on December 4, 2009. This motion is currently pending before the Court. The Second 
Amended Complaint does not alter the relief sought in Count I, II, or III a, currently drafted. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration be, and is hereby, DENIED. 
Dated this 2ff~ay of March, 2010. 
or District Judge 
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Lojek Law Offices 
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Keely Duke 
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702 W. State St. Ste. 700 
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SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDING 
FOR NOTICE 
WHEREAS, a the above captioned matter is currently pending before the Court as a no-opt out 
class action (herein the "Action"); 
WHEREAS, the Court has received the Stipulation of Settlement dated May _JQ_, 11--
2010 (the "Stipulation"), that has been entered into by the Class Counsel and SIF Counsel, and 
the Court has reviewed the Stipulation and its attached Exhibits (A through I); 
WHEREAS the Court has also received under seal a Supplemental Stipulation dated May~ 
2010, a Certification of Gilardi & Company in support of their nomination as Settlement 




Administrator, and a Statement of Notice Alternatives and the Court has reviewed these 
documents; 
WHEREAS, the Plaintiffs having made application, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e), for an order preliminarily approving the Stipulation of Settlement of this 
Action, in accordance with the Stipulation which, together with the Exhibits annexed thereto, 
sets forth the terms and conditions for a proposed Settlement of the Action and for dismissal of 
the Action with prejudice, except as to the Excluded Dividend Periods, upon the terms and 
conditions set forth therein; and the Court having read and considered the Stipulation and the 
Exhibits annexed thereto and the other filings identified above; and 
WHEREAS, all defined terms contained herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in 
the Stipulation; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
I. The Court does hereby preliminarily approve the Stipulation and the Settlement set forth 
therein, subject to further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing described below. 
2. A hearing (the "Fairness Hearing") shall be held before this Court on September 16, 2010 
at 1 :30 p.m., at the Canyon County Courthouse, Court Room of Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
Caldwell Idaho, to hear arguments from any objectors who duly file objections and 
presentations in support of the Settlement and to determine: 
a. Whether the proposed Settlement of the Action on the terms and conditions 
provided for in the Stipulation is fair, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement 
Class and should be approved by the Court; 
b. Whether a Judgment as provided in iJl.18 of the Stipulation should be entered 




c. Whether the proposed Plan of Allocation should be approved; 
d. The amount of fees and expenses that should be awarded to Class Counsel and the 
amount of class representative compensation that should be awarded to the Class 
Plaintiffs. 
3. The Court may adjourn the Final Approval Hearing without further notice to Members of 
the Settlement Class. 
4. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and consistent with prior 
rulings in this matter, this Court preliminarily certifies, for purposes of effectuating this 
Settlement, a non-opt out Settlement Class composed of: 
All persons or entities, other than Lojek Law Offices Chtd. and Gordon 
Law Offices Chtd., who: 
a. purchased one or more policies for worker's compensation 
insurance from the SIF on or after July 1, 2001, and before June 30, 2007, 
and retained one or more of those policies for a period of at least 180 days 
following the date of purchase; 
b. were billed an annual premium for each such policy(s) by the 
SIF which was equal to or less than $2,500.00; 
c. did not, as to each policy described by (a) and (b ), receive a 
Dividend equal to an amount determined by multiplying the billed annual 
premium by the Dividend Readjustment Rate applicable to the Dividend 
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Qualifying Period in which the policy was purchased; and, 
d. have not been excluded from the Settlement Class by Order of 
. 
the Court. 
5. With respect to the Settlement Class, this Court preliminarily finds for purposes of 
effectuating this Settlement that (a) the Members of the Settlement Class are so numerous 
thatjoinder of all Settlement Class Members in the class action is impracticable; (b) there 
are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement Class which predominate over 
any individual questions; (c) the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the 
Settlement Class; (d) the Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately 
represented and protected the interests of all of the Settlement Class Members; ( e) a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy, considering: (i) the interests of the Members of the Settlement Class in 
individually controlling the prosecution of the separate actions; (ii) the extent and nature 
- -
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by Members of the 
Settlement Class; (iii) the desirability or undesirability of continuing the litigation of 
these claims in this particular forum; and (iv) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of the class action and (f) the SIF is alleged to have acted on grounds 
generally applicable to the Settlement Class as a whole, which, if found by the Court to 
be true, would appear to support declaratory relief with respect to the Settlement Class. 
6. The Court approves, as to form and content, the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class 
Action (the "Notice Booklet"), the Summary Notice for Publication ("Summary Notice"), 
the Postcard Notice ("Postcard"), the Application for Inclusion, the Objection form, and 
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the Escrow Agreement, attached to the Stipulation as Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, and I, and 
the Plaintiffs Statement of Notice Alternatives and finds that the mailing and distribution 
of the Postcard along with of the Summary Notice and the availability of a website and a 
call center all performed and provided in the substantially in the manner and form set 
forth in Paragraph 7 of this Order best satisfy the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 and due process, and is the best notice practicable under the circumstances 
and shall constitute due and sufficient notice to all Persons entitled thereto. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court appoints Gilardi & 
Co. LLC ("Settlement Administrator") to supervise and administer the notice procedure 
as well as the processing of claims as more fully set forth below: 
a. Not later than 21 days from the entry of this Order (the "Notice Date"), Class 
Counsel shall cause a copy of the Postcard, substantially in the forms annexed to 
the Stipulation as Exhibit E, to be mailed by first class mail to all Settlement Class 
Members who can based upon information supplied by SIF be identified and to 
continue for up to 45 days thereafter with other reasonable follow-up procedures 
(return address request, internet search, analysis of business entity records at the 
Idaho Secretary of States website) for the purpose of identifying and obtaining 
delivery by mail of notice upon Settlement Class Members who did not appear to 
have received the initial notification; 
b. Not later than the Notice Date Class Counsel shall cause the Summary Notice to 
be published once in the following papers of general circulation in the state of 
Idaho; 
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Yes No Paper 
,11. Coeur d'Alene Press - Coeur d'Alene, ID 
.{t Idaho Press Tribune -Nampa, ID 
4 The Idaho State Journal - Pocatello, ID 
~I.. The Lewiston Tribune - Lewiston, ID 
/it The Idaho Statesman - Boise, ID 
.{t Post Register - Idaho Falls, ID 
,{i.. Spokane Spokesman-Review - Spokane, ID 
,(l The Times-News - Twin Falls, ID 
. 
/it USA Today (regionalized for Denver/Seattle regions which Cover Idaho) 
c. Not later than the Notice Date Class Counsel shall cause the Stipulation and its 
Exhibits, this Order, the Objection Form, and the Inclusion Form to be posted on 
the following website: http://www.gilardi.com and to cause a call center to be 
created by Gilardi & Co to handle calls from any Settlement Class Members or 
possible Settlement Class members who want to obtain information or documents; 
and, 
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d. On or before September 2, 2010, Class Counsel shall cause to be served on SIF 
counsel and filed with the Court proof, by affidavit or declaration, of compliance 
with the foregoing notice requirements. 
8. All Members of the Settlement Class shall be bound by all determinations and judgments 
in the Action concerning the Settlement, whether favorable or unfavorable to the 
Settlement Class. Persons or entities with objections to the Stipulation, the Settlement, 
any applications for award of attorney fees and costs, any Administrative Costs, or the 
terms of this Order regarding Notice, Objections and inclusion into the Settlement Class, 
must make those objections in a timely manner or they are subject to being deemed to 
have been waived. 
9. Settlement Class Members who wish to object to the Settlement shall complete an 
Objection in the form attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit F and shall submit that 
Objection to Class Counsel at SIF Claim, Post Office Box, 1442, Boise Idaho which must 
be received in that box not later than August 26,2010. Class Counsel shall immediately 
file with the Court and serve upon SIF all Objections other than those seeking an 
exclusion. As to Objections seeking an exclusion, Class Counsel may either file those 
Objections with the Court or seek a stipulation of exclusion from the SIF. If the SIF 
declines to stipulate to exclusion the Objection should be immediately filed with the 
Court. All Objections and any stipulations for exclusion must be filed not later than 
September 2, 2010. Class Counsel is responsible for assuring that all Objections and all 
stipulations are filed in a timely manner, Class Counsel shall by not later than September 
2, 2010, file a certification that the provisions of this paragraph have been fully complied 




10. Persons or entities who believe that they should be members of the Settlement Class but 
who do not appear to be included in the information regarding that Settlement Class 
initially provided to Class Counsel by SIF, shall have the opportunity to submit a request 
for inclusion in the form attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit G and shall be entitled to 
the benefit of the procedures set forth in Exhibit G and the Stipulation. To the extent 
that any such person or entity is ultimately denied membership in the Settlement Class, 
that person or entity shall be thereafter treated as excluded from the Settlement Class and . 
shall not be bound or limited in anyway by any Judgment entered based upon the 
Stipulation. 
11. Any member of the Settlement Class may enter an appearance in the Action and shall be 
deemed to have done so upon the filing of their Objection. All persons who appear in 
the Action shall do so at their own expense individually or through counsel of their own 
-
choice. All entities who appear in the Action shall do so at their own expense and must 
do so through counsel of their own choice. All persons or entities who do not enter an 
appearance or file an Objection will be represented by Class Counsel. 
12. The Escrow Agent agreed to by the Settling Parties, is authorized to remove 
$ po ~z:z .... ~ from the Common Fund and place it into a Notice and 
Administration Costs Account from which the Settlement Administrator is authorized to 
pay all Settlement Administration Costs. Class Counsel is responsible to insure that the 
funds in the Notice and Administration Costs Account are properly spent and accounted 
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for and for filing with the Court a report accounting for any funds withdrawn from that 
account. 
On this 2-~""-aay of Ma, ,2010. 
Judge Thomas J. Ry 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £day of~ 2010, I caused to be delivered the 
foregoing document, addressed to the following and delivered by the method indicated below: 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 W. Hays StreetPO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208-343-5200 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC$f p f 7 2010 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF E~~~OUNTY CLERK 
I RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho 
Professional Association. 
Case No. CV 06-7877 
, t DEPUTY en 
Plaintiffs, 
FINAL WDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. 
HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX BLACK, 
and STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
member of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing pursuant to the Court's Order Preliminarily 
Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice, dated May 24, 2010. The Settling Parties had 
applied for approval of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated as of May 
5, 2010 (the "Stipulation"). Due and adequate notice having been given of the Settlement as 
required in said Order, and the Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings held 
herein, and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADWDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This Judgment incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation, and all terms 
used herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation. 
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2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Action and over all Parties to 
the Action including all members of the Settlement Class. 
3. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby certifies, for 
purposes of effectuating this Settlement, a no-opt out Settlement Class of all persons or 
entities, other than Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. and Gordon Law Offices, Chtd., who: 
a. purchased one or more policies for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF 
on or after July I, 200 I and before June 3 0, 2007 and retained one or more of 
those policies for a period of at least 180 days following the date of purchase; 
b. were billed an annual premium for each such policy(s) by the SIF which was 
equal to or less than $2,500.00; 
c. did not, as to each policy described by (a) and (b), immediately above, receive a 
Dividend equal to an amount determined by multiplying the billed annual 
premium by the Dividend Readjustment Rate applicable to the Dividend 
Qualifying Period in which the policy was purchased; and, 
d. have not been excluded from the Settlement Class by Order of the Court. 
4. With respect to the Settlement Class, this Court finds for the purposes of effectuating this 
Settlement that: 
a. the members of the Settlement Class are so numerous that joinder of all 
Settlement Class members in the Action is impracticable; 
b. there are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement Class which 
predominate over any individual questions; 
c. the claims of the Class Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Settlement Class; 
d. the Class Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately represented and 
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protected the interests of all of the Settlement Class members; 
e. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy, considering: 
1. the interests of the Members of the Settlement Class in individually 
controlling the prosecution of the separate actions; 
11. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by Members of the Settlement Class; 
iii. the desirability or undesirability of continuing the litigation of these claims 
in this forum; and, 
1v. the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class 
action. 
f. the SIF is alleged to have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Settlement 
Class as a whole, which, if found by the Court to be true, would appear to support 
declaratory relief with respect to the Settlement Class. 
5. Except as to any individual claim of those persons or entities (identified in Exhibit 1 
attached hereto) who have by stipulation of the Parties or by Order of the Court been 
excluded from the Action or who sought but not obtained by agreement of the Parties 
inclusion into the Settlement Class, the Released Claims, including all Claims stated in 
the action relating to the Dividend Qualifying Periods, are dismissed with prejudice as to 
the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Settlement Class, and as against SIF. The 
parties are to bear their own fees and costs, except as otherwise provided in the 
Stipulation. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civi-1 Procedure, this Court hereby approves the 
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Settlement set forth in the Stipulation and finds that said Settlement is, in all respects, 
fair, reasonable and adequate to, and is in the best interests of, the Class Plaintiffs, the 
Settlement Class and each of the members of the Settlement Class. The Court further 
finds that the Stipulation is the result of arm's-length negotiations between experienced 
counsel representing the interests of the Class Plaintiffs, the members of the Settlement 
Class, and the SIF. Accordingly, the Settlement embodied in the Stipulation is hereby 
approved in all respects and shall be consummated in accordance with its terms and 
provisions. The Settling Parties are hereby directed to perform each and every term of the 
Stipulation. 
7. Upon the Effective Date, Class Plaintiffs, and each of the members of the Settlement 
Class shall be deemed to have, and by operation of this Final Judgment shall have, fully, 
finally, and forever released, relinquished and discharged all Released Claims against the 
SIF. The Settling Parties have agreed to the release of unknown claims, and the Court 
find that this agreement was bargained for and is a material element of the Settlement and 
that as a consequence, all unknown claims which are part of the Released Claims shall be 
deemed released. 
8. Upon the Effective Date, the Class Plaintiffs and all members of the Settlement Class and 
anyone claiming through or on behalf of any of them, are forever barred and enjoined 
from commencing, instituting, or continuing to prosecute any action or proceeding in any 
court of law or equity, arbitration tribunal, administrative forum, or other forum of any 
kind, asserting against the SIF any of the Released Claims. Provided, nothing in this 
Order shall be deemed to release, dismiss or bar any appeal of the Court's rulings 
applying the statute oflimitations to claims for dividends relative to the dividend periods 
FINAL WDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE Page4 
000290 
beginning July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000 and July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001. 
9. Upon the Effective Date, SIF shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment 
shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished and discharged the Class 
Plaintiffs, the members of the Settlement Class Members, and Class Counsel from all 
claims (including, without limitation, unknown claims) arising out of, relating to, or in 
connection with the institution, prosecution, assertion, settlement or resolution of the 
Action or the Released Claims except that SIF shall not be deemed to have waived any 
claim that it may have against a Class Plaintiff or member of the Settlement Class for 
amounts which actually are owed to it by a Class Plaintiff or member of the Settlement 
Class for reasons unrelated to the claims made in the Action but only to the extent that 
those amounts are not satisfied by any payment made to SIF by the Settlement 
Administrator pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation. 
10. The Notice Plan established by the Court in the Order Preliminarily Approving 
Settlement and Providing for Notice constituted the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all Members of the Settlement Class who 
could be identified through reasonable effort. Said notice provided the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances of those proceedings and of the matters set forth 
therein, including the proposed Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, to all members of 
the Settlement Class, and said notice fully satisfied the requirements of Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, the requirements of due process, and any other applicable law. 
11. The Allocation Plan set forth in the Stipulation is found to be an appropriate formula for 
allocating the Common Fund among the Settlement Class members. The Settlement 
Administrator is directed to, on the Effective Date, proceed to distribute to each 
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Settlement Class member that has been located during the Notice process that members 
proportionate share ( as determined utilizing the allocation formula set forth in the 
Stipulation) of the Common Fund after all fees and costs awarded by the Court and all 
Exclusion Reimbursement have been paid or set aside. As to all distributable funds 
which, after six (6) months following the Effective Date of the Settlement, have not been 
claimed or cannot be distributed due to the inability to locate the Settlement Class 
member, Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator are directed to account to the 
Court for these funds and seek direction conforming to the Settlement relative to the 
distribution of any Undistributed and Undistributable Funds. 
12. Any proposal submitted by Class Counsel for the payment of any balance remaining in 
the Notice and Administration Costs Account after completion of the duties of the 
Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Stipulation and any orders entered 
regarding any distributions from the Common Fund for payment of attorneys' fees the 
cost of which may not exceed 331/3 % of the Common Fund, for payment of litigation 
expenses including Class Plaintiff compensation the cost of which may not exceed Q/34~ 
of the Common Fund or Settlement Administrator Expenses actually incurred and not to 
exceed ~ of the Common Fund shall in no way disturb or affect this Judgment and 
shall be considered separate from this Judgment. 
13. Neither the Stipulation nor the Settlement contained therein, nor any act performed or 
document executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the Stipulation or the Settlement: 
a. is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the 
validity of any Released Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of SIF; or 
b. is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, any 
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fault or omission of any of SIF in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. 
in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal. 
14. SIF may file the Stipulation and/or the Final Judgment in any other action that may be 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J1_ day of ~bt,( 2010, I caused the furegoing 
document to be delivered by the method indicated~\va,;daddressed to the following: 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices, CHTD. 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD. 
623 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 1712 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorneys for the Plaintif.fe 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CANYO~ CjbUNTY CLEF 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON ';r1) , DEPUl 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELA~E 
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RO!>NEY A. 
HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX BLACK, 
and STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
member of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7877 
ORDER FIXING THE AMOUNT OF 
THE COMMON FUND WHICH MAY 
BE APPLIED TO THE PAYMENT OF 
FEES AND AWARDING SUMS 
CERTAIN FOR THE 
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION 
EXPENSES, THE PAYMENT OF 
CLASS PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND THE 
PAYMENT OF FINAL SETTLEMENT 
FUND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 16, 2010, pursuant to the 
Application of Class Counsel for an Order Fixing the Amount of the Common Fund which May, 
by Further Order of the Court, Be Applied to the Payment of Attorney Fees to Class Counsel, 
and/or the Award of Sums Certain/or the Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, the Payment 
of Class Plaintiff Incentive Compensation and the Payment of Final Settlement Fund 
Administration Expenses (the "Application"). 
The Court notes that, as reflected in the Second Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline In Support 
of Application of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, only one Objection (the Amended Notice of 
Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application/or Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs out of 
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Settlement Proceeds, herein the "Fouser Objection") was served on Class Counsel (for the sake 
of consistency in the records, all capitalized terms used in this Order which are not defined in 
this Order shall have the same meanings set forth in the Stipulation for Settlement which was 
preliminarily approved by the Court on May 24, 2010) and that Fouser Objection has been duly 
filed with the Court. No other objections have been filed with the Court. Class Counsel 
appeared at the hearing and Bruce S. Bistline presented argument. No other person or entity 
appeared at the hearing. After hearing argument of counsel and reviewing the filings relative to 
the Application, the Fouser Objection, the filings relative to the Reply to Amended Notice of 
Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application for Attorney Fees and Costs Out of Settlement 
and the Class Counsel's Reports which have been filed on a monthly basis in July, August and 
September 20 I 0, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following 
findings: 
I. The Fouser Objection, though styled as an objection to the Settlement and to the award of 
attorneys' fees and costs is in fact only an objection to the award of fees as requested by 
Class Counsel and in this regard only appears to be an objection to the billing rate 
claimed for Bruce S. Bistline and Philip Gordon. 
2. With the exception of those portions of the Application which seek ratification of 
amounts already paid from the Notice and Administration Costs Account for the 
execution of the Notice Plan, an Order directing additional payments from the Notice and 
Administration Costs Account to pay the balance of the expenses associated with the 
execution of the Notice Plan and an Order directing that additional funds be withdrawn 
from the Qualified Settlement Fund and deposited in the Notice and Administration Cost 
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Account for the payment of the remaining expenses of Settlement Administration Costs 
(including costs of disbursement and account closure), the interests of Class Counsel or 
Class Plaintiffs, whom Class Counsel represent, are to some degree adverse to the 
interests of the Class. In these circumstances, while the Court has discretion to determine 
the matters submitted by the Application, the Court also has a duty to the Class to ensure 
that the proposed payments from the Common Fund are fair and reasonable payments. 
3. The amounts sought in the Application are all equal to or less than the amounts which 
Class Counsel announced that they would be seeking in the Notice of Proposed Class 
Action Settlement which has been available since June 14, 2010 to the Settlement Class 
members. 
4. The Application announcing the specific amounts sought by Class Counsel was filed on 
August 16, 2010, and posted on the website on or about the dates of August 16-18, 2010, 
and the extensive documentation supporting that Application was filed with the Court on 
August 23, 2010, and posted on the website on or about the dates of August 19- 20, 2010. 
5. The charges billed by the Settlement Administrator for the purposes of executing the 
Court's Notice Plan as set forth in the Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and 
Providing for Notice, May 24, 2010, which total $96,628.10, are fair and reasonable 
charges for the services necessarily supplied. Those charges are sufficiently documented 
and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and they have not been objected to 
by members of the Settlement Class. 
6. Class Counsel has acted properly in authorizing the Settlement Administrator to pay itself 
the sum of $78,835.42 out of the Notice and Administration Costs Account. 
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7. After the distribution of $78,835.42 as authorized by Class Counsel and ratified by this 
Court and the payment of $17,792.68, the Notice and Administration Costs Account, 
which the Court directed should be opened with an initial withdrawal from the Common 
Fund in the amount of $110,522.00, should have a balance, after the payment of all costs 
associated with the execution of the Notice Plan, of $13,893.90. 
8. The charges, as estimated by the Settlement Administrator for the services necessary to 
execute the Court's directives and the provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement relative 
to distribution of the Common Fund and the closure of all related accounts, are 
$64,245.00. These charges are fair and reasonable charges for the services which will 
necessarily be supplied to distribute the Common Fund and close all related accounts. 
Those charges are sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to the Settlement 
Class and they have not been objected to by members of the Settlement Class. 
9. The Settling Parties' agreement, in paragraph 2.2.5.2 of the Stipulation for Settlement, 
that the sum of 105% of the estimated charges for executing distribution of the Common 
Fund and closure or all related accounts, is a fair and reasonable means for insuring that 
enough funds are withheld from the Common Fund prior to the allocation and 
distribution of that fund to ensure that all costs of settlement administration are covered. 
This provision of the Settlement Agreement has been sufficiently documented and 
supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and it has not been objected to by 
members of the Settlement Class. 
10. To ensure that 105% of $64,245.00 ($67,457.00) is in the Settlement Administration Cost 
Account prior to any allocation and distribution of the Common Fund, it will be 
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necessary to transfer an additional $53,565.10 out of the Qualified Settlement Fund and 
into the Notice and Administration Costs Account. 
11. The total amount which will be transferred from the Common Fund for the payment of 
Settlement Administration Costs will be $164,085.10 which represents 2.378% of the 
Common Fund. 
12. The litigation costs totaling $8,440.71 which Class Counsel has asked to be reimbursed 
from the Common Fund prior to any allocation and distribution of the Common Fund are 
fair and reasonable costs which were necessarily incurred in the representation of the 
Settlement Class. Those costs are sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to 
the Settlement Class and they have not been objected to by members of the Settlement 
Class. 
13. Incentive payments to Class Plaintiffs are a reasonable and appropriate way to incentivize 
citizens who have suffered, what is for any individual class member a relatively nominal 
loss, to take on the burden and responsibility of serving as a plaintiff in a class action so 
that the entire class can recover what is due to it from a defendant. 
14. In this action, it is apparent that the Class Plaintiffs were called upon to participate in 
pleading review, strategy decisions, document assembly, preparation of discovery 
responses and preparation for depositions. Two of the Class Plaintiffs were actually 
deposed. All Class Plaintiffs provided a valuable service to the Settlement Class. 
15. Incentive payments to each of the Class Plaintiffs in the amount of$ 5,000.00 are fair and 
reasonable under the entirety of the circumstances of this case. Those payments are 
sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and they 
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have not been objected to by members of the Settlement Class. 
16. Taken together as "litigation expenses" the reimbursement sought by Class Counsel and 
the incentive pay authorized by the Court represent 0.34% the Common Fund. 
17. Class Counsel has invested a substantial amount of time and resources in this action on 
behalf of the Settlement Class. As part of the services they have supplied to the 
Settlement Class they have, in addition to investing their own time and efforts, 
maintained their offices, retained support staff including paralegals and secretaries and 
invested the time and efforts of those employees into pursuit of this litigation on behalf of 
the Settlement Class. 
18. While it appears that complete time records have not been kept by any of Class Counsel, 
the records that do exist demonstrate that Gordon Law Offices has invested in excess of 
1,211.20 attorney hours over a period of more than 4 years. The time records of Lojek 
Law Offices were destroyed by a flood but based upon the affidavits provided, the Court 
finds that Lojek Law Offices invested in excess of 775 attorney hours, also over a period 
of more than 4 years. In addition, Class Counsel have spent time since this information 
was supplied to the Court and will continue to spend time fulfilling their duties to the 
Settlement Class associated with overseeing costs reimbursements to the Settlement 
Administrator, processing applications for inclusion, reporting to the Court and 
presenting motions to the Court as are necessary to administer to the distribution of the 
common fund and to wrap up these proceedings. The concerns raised in the Fouser 
Objection with respect to the hours reported by Class Counsel have been adequately 
addressed in responsive affidavits of Class Counsel and the Court can find no factual 
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basis for concluding that Class Counsel have wasted time or spent fewer hours than 
reported. 
19. Class Counsel has provided highly competent representation to the Settlement Class and 
shown a high degree of technical expertise in the management of this class action 
litigation on behalf of the Settlement Class. It is apparent to the Court that to fulfill their 
responsibilities to the Settlement Class and the Court, that Class Counsel have to be 
highly detail oriented, skillful legal writers, thorough and effective litigators, thorough 
and creative negotiators and document drafters, skillful appellate attorneys, and ,in this 
case, effective lobbyists. While many attorneys have some of these skills and talents, 
those who possess several or all of them are uncommon and it is reasonable that lawyers 
who possess and employ these attributes are entitled to charge and receive top market 
rates. 
20. Class Counsel has taken a significant risk on behalf of the Settlement Class. They took 
on a case which was either a case of first impression or one which might well have been 
determined adversely to them based upon the application of existing decisional law. They 
correctly anticipated that the case was not going to be resolved without at an appeal. 
They understood that the case they were taldng on could tum out to be litigation about 
whether an agency administrator had abused his discretion and therefore a case which 
could be complicated and expensive to litigate. 
21. Class Counsel was confronted by an aggressive defense by a highly competent firm that 
had evidently been given a good deal of latitude in the formation of strategy and the 
investment of time and resources in presenting the case. 
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22. Class counsel around the Country who are separately billing for paralegal work are 
charging fees higher than what are requested by Class Counsel. Class action litigation 
firms in Chicago and Washington D.C. are billing their firm partners at a rate between 
$425.00 and $700.00 per hour. Attorneys in Seattle and Portland are billing their firm 
partners at a rate between $280.00 and $650.00 per hour with most being billed at over 
$355.00 per hour. A firm in Salt Lake City is billing their attorneys at a rate between 
$375.00 and $575.00 per hour and had billed these same attorneys at between $295.00 
and $450.00 per hour in 2006. In Boise, Idaho, a firm which negotiated an arm's length 
agreement to establish relative values of contribution between lawyers in firms in Boise, 
Minneapolis and Seattle is billing attorney time at between $450.00 and $500.00 per hour 
for partners and $385.00 per hour for associates. 
23. For the purposes of a lodestar calculation, the Court finds that given the skill and 
experience of Class Counsel, the rates being charged for class action representation in 
City of Boise and in around the Country and the claims made in the Fouser Objection, an 
hourly fee rate for Class Counsel as set forth below is fair and reasonable and that the 
appropriate minimum lodestar based on these rates is as set forth: 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Philip Gordon 
Donald W. Lojek 
Total 
$ 375 X 1,079.30 = $404,737.50 
$ 375 X 131.90 = $ 49,462.50 
$ 425 X 775.00 = $329,375.00 
$ 783,575.00 
Class Counsel, over the course of nearly four and one half years, have committed 
valuable resources to the representation of the Settlement Class. They have to date been 
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paid nothing for this effort and they have in the meantime paid overhead and litigation 
expenses out of their own resources. They took a very real risk of engaging in a losing 
effort and ending up paying opposing parties' costs and potentially opposing parties' fees 
on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs. The case involved extensive amounts of briefing and 
substantial amounts of document and discovery work. In addition, to achieve a recovery 
Class Counsel was required to successfully prosecute an appeal and engage in legislative 
lobbying efforts. Moreover, it is clear that they have spent and will spend more time · 
than has been used for the purpose of a lodestar calculation. In the market place in which· 
attorneys are hired to take cases upon a contingent fee basis, these are all factors which 
bear upon the negotiation of a fee agreement. Considering these factors and the case law 
relative to the role of the multiplier in a lodestar calculation, the Court finds that a 
multiplier of between 2.5 and 3.5 is fair and reasonable for the purpose of a lodestar cross 
check of a percentage fee award. 
24. Class Counsel has requested that the Court utilize a percentage fee calculation to 
determine the award of fees to be paid to Class Counsel from the Common Fund and in 
this regard has requested a fee of 3 3 1 /3 percent of the Common Fund. The Court is 
aware that the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has favored the use of percentage fee awards 
and has, with respect to percentage fee calculations, adopted a benchmark of25% of the 
common fund which should be adjusted up and down based upon the circumstances of 
the case. 
25. In addition to circumstances as found above, the settlement obtained, while a significant 
amount and a high percentage of the maximum amount arguably due to the Settlement 
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Class, is by class action standards relatively small and this is a factor which should be 
considered by the Court for the purpose of considering a percentage fee award request. 
26. Under all of the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a percentage fee award of 
33 1/3 % of the Common Fund is fair and reasonable under the entirety of the 
circumstances of this case. The request for this award has been sufficiently documented 
and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and, with the exception of the Fouser 
Objection, the members of the Settlement Class have not been objected to the requested 
fee award. 
27. The percentage fee award approved by the Court is supported by the use of the lodestar 
cross check which involves multiplying the lodestar fee - in this case$ 783,575.00 -- by 
the multiplier found reasonable by the Court- in this case between 2.5 and 3.5, or 
$2,350,725. 
28. Class Counsel have made a request for immediate and future periodic payments of fees. 
This request has been disclosed to the Settlement Class in the Notice of Proposed 
Settlement of Class Action and no objection has been made to the request. The request is 
fair and reasonable. Accordingly, Class Counsel may present to the Court specific 
requests for actual fees to be paid from the Qualified Settlement Fund in both immediate 
and periodic future payments provided that the cost to the Qualified Settlement Fund of 
those payments and all administration expenses do not exceed the percentage fee awarded 
by the Court. 
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BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the manager of the Notice and 
Administration Costs Account is directed to pay itself, from that account, the sum of 
$17,792.68 as the final payment upon all costs incurred by the Settlement Administrator 
for services necessarily provided in the course of executing the Court's Notice Plan. 
2. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund 
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to 
Settlement Class members, to transfer to the Notice and Administration Costs Account 
from the Qualified Settlement Fund the sum of $53,565.10 to be held there subject to 
further Orders of this Court authorizing distributions from that account. 
3. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund 
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to 
Settlement Class members, to pay to Class Counsel (as Class Counsel may direct) from 
the Qualified Settlement Fund the total sum of $8,440.71 as reimbursement to Class 
Counsel for litigation costs. 
4. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund 
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to 
Settlement Class members, to pay to each Class Plaintiff from the Qualified Settlement 
Fund, the sum of$ 5,000.00 as class plaintiff incentive compensation. 
5. Class Counsel is entitled to a fee of thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3) percent of the 
Common Fund. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for 
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the Common Fund (held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any 
allocation or distribution to Settlement Class members to either pay this amount in 
accordance with a further Order of the Court or to set this amount aside before the 
balance of the Qualified Settlement Fund is allocated among or distributed to Settlement 
Class members. 
6. Class Counsel may petition the Court for an order making specific provisions for 
immediate and periodic future payments of attorneys' fees to Class Counsel from the 
Qualified Settlement Fund provided that the cost of those payments and any related 
administrative expenses do not exceed the percentage fee as awarded by this Order. 
7. Any proposal submitted by Class Counsel for the payment of any balance remaining in 
the Notice and Administration Costs Account after completion of the duties of the 
Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Stipulation For Settlement and any 
orders entered regarding any distributions from the Common Fund for payment of 
attorneys= fees the cost of which Fund may not exceed 33 1/3 % of the Common Fund or 
to deal with undistributable funds in the Common Fund, shall in no way disturb or affect 
any Judgment entered by the Court pursuant to the Stipulation For Settlement and shall 
be considered separate from any such Judgment. 
DATED this 't.0.fl.,.day of >cyfc."!\ k , 2010. 
/,~ 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was forwarded to 
the following persons on this J ~ 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702-5512 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd _ 
P. 0. Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701-1712 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
Trudy Hanson F ouser 
Julianne S. Hall 
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Objector 
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ORDER OF PAYMENT OF FEES & LITIGATION EXPENSES AND A AWARDING 
CLASS PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION & ATTORNEY FEES Pagel3 
000308 
Donald W. Lojek ISBN1395 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
~LE 
l l~CT ·;7 2010 
D 
P.M. 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
~ .DEPury Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, 
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER 
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association, CASE NO. CV06-7877 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL 
VS. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, mDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their 
capacity as member of the Board of Directors 
of the State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Filing Fee: $86.00 Idaho Supreme Court 
$15.00 Canyon County 
000309 
OR I Gt NAt 
TO: THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, et al AND THEIR ATTORNEYS 
OF RECORD, HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT AND BLANTON. NOTICE IS HEREBY 
GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Randolph E. Farber, Scott Alan Becker and Critter 
Clinic, acting on behalf of themselves and the Class which they represent, appeal 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Statute of Limitations (a partial summary 
judgment) which was entered by the Honorable James Morfitt and filed on April 
30, 2007 and from Judge Morfitt's subsequent Memorandum Decision and Order 
Upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 25, 2010, which 
declined to reconsider the Order granting partial summary judgment. These 
Orders became final and appealable when on September 17, 2010, the Final 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice was filed. 
The claims arising from the Plaintiffs' Complaint pertained to a series of 
dividend distributions which were made near the first of every year beginning 
January of 2002 and continuing through January of 2009. The partial summary 
judgment based on the statute of limitations foreclosed those claims as to the 
dividends distributed prior to January of 2004. This partial summary judgment 
was not appealable until the rest of the claims presented in the action were 
resolved by the District Court. On May 10, 2010 the Parties filed a Stipulation of 
Settlement with the Court as to "released claims" which specifically included only 
the claims related to the dividends distributed in January 2004 and each year 
thereafter through and including the dividend distributed in January of 2009. On 
May 24, 2010 the District Court preliminarily approved this Settlement and on 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 
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September 16, 20 I 0, the District Court gave final approval to the settlement and, 
pursuant to the terms of the settlement, dismissed all unresolved claims in the 
action by the Final Judgment filed September 17, 20 I 0. 
2. Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to I.AR. 
ll(a)(6). 
3. Appellants intend to assert on appeal that the aforesaid Decisions and Orders 
constitute an error of law and should be reversed on appeal with instructions to the 
District Court to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs forthwith nunc pro tune. 
4. No transcript of any oral argument is requested by the Appellants. 
5. Documents to be included in the record in addition to those documents 
automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are: 
(a) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about 2/13/2007. 
(b) All memoranda submitted by counsel either supporting or resisting 
motions for summary judgment on statutes of limitation including but not 
limited to: 
(i) Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on or about 2/13/2007; 
(ii) Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on or about 3/12/2007; 
(iii) Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed on or about 3/28/2007. 
(c) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration filed on or about 12/04/2009. 
(d) All memoranda submitted by counsel either supporting or resisting 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration including but not limited to: 
(i) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and 
Alternative Motion to Bifurcate filed on or about 12/04/2009. 
(ii) Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class filed on or about 
1/04/2010. 
(iii) Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of 
Class filed on or about 1/19/2010. 
(e) Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on or about 12/04/2009. 
6. The undersigned certifies: 
(a) That the clerk of the court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), i.e., in the 
amount of $ l 00. 00; 
(b) All appellate filing fees have been paid; and 
(c) Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of October, 2010. 
Bruce S. Bistline, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By <ZlJt 
Donald W. Lojek, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appell,ants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay ofOctober, 20 I 0, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and 
addressed as follows: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ..-r- U.S. Mail, postage paid 
[ ] Overnight Express Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Copy: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
~L-
Donald W. Lojek 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
rfuG I A.~ E D P.M. 
/ OCT 1 8 2010 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN ) 
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho ) 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T RANDALL, DEPUTY 






THE IDAHO ST ATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its manager, and ) 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, ) 
MARGUARITE MC LAUGHLIN, GERALD ) 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI ) 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE ) 
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RODNEY ) 
A. HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX ) 
BLANCK and STEVE LANDON in their ) 
capacity as members of the Board of Directors ) 
of the State Insurance Fund, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38140-2010 
Canyon County Docket No. 2006-7877 
A Clerk!s Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 27, 2008, in appeal No. 
35144, Farber v State Insurance Fund; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal 
No. 35144. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepar.e and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 35144. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be 
filed with this Court after settlement. Further, the exhibits submitted in prior appeal No. 35144 are 
not covered by this Order and they will not be sent to the Supreme Court unless specifically 
requested by the parties. The party requesting any or all of the prior exhibits must specifically 
000315 
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designate those exhibits being requested. 
DATED this/ L/-tl, day of October 2010. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
00031.6 
HALL FARLEY 
-:-1 _ ___r_ ___ -- ,- -- ---.. ~ - . 
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
(gioo21oos 
! 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
F .. LA.~~M. 
OCT 2 O 2010/ / Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\313-461.2\Appcal. 2nd\Request Addnl T11111s.doc 
Attomeys for Defendants 
I 
CANYON COUNTY C~ERK 
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THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. CV06-7877 I 
I 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FdR 
ADDITIONS TO REPORTER'S 
I 




TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THEIR ATIO!UIBYS 
I 








DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CL~RK'S 
RECORD-1 ' 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendants/respondents, Idaho $tate 
' I 
I 
Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of the State Insurance Fund, and the 8ioard 
I 
of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF''). hereby request, pursuant to Rule ~ 9 of 
i 
the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the. following material in the Repo~er's 
I 
I 
Transcript and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be included by the Idaho 
I 
Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal filed October 6. 2010. and Idaho Supreme C~urt's 
! 
Order Augmenting Appeal filed October 14, 2010: I 
I 
1. Requested additions to the Report's Transcript: 
a. Motions hearing of April 6. 2007; and 
b. Motion hearing ofFebruary 26, 2010. 
2. Requested additions to the Clerk's Record: 
a Affidavit of Michael Camilleri, filed February 13, 2007; and 
b. Affidavit of James M. Alcorn, filed February 13, 2007. 
I 
3. I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served 
! 
on each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested, as named below at 
the addresses set out below: 
Kim Saunders 
Court Reporter for Judge Morfitt (April 6, 2007 hearing) 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Yvonne Hyde Gier 
Court Reporter for Judge Morfitt (February 26, 2010 hearing) 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 











-;:---...----' - ---·- -------· 
4. I further certify that this request for additional record has been served 1pon 
I 
the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
RESPECTUFLL Y SUBMITTED this 20th day of October, 2010. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
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bERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , 
'1--- I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Zfj day of October, 2010, I caused to be! 
- I 
served a true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below. and ! 
addressed to each of the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
FSJC.NO.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorne:ys for Plaintiffs 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintijfo 
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Donald W. Lojek tBN 1395 
Lojek Law OfficeJ, CHID 
1199 W. Main Str~et 
PO Box 1712 1 
Boise, ID 83701 
_F __ , A.~_;j_· Sff_P,M, 
NOV O 9 2010 
Telephone: 20 -343-7733 
Facsimile: 20,-345-0050 
Philip Gordon 1sJN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline isBN 1988 
GORDON LA w .PFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702i 
Telephone: 208/ 45-7100 
Facsimile: 208/ 45"0050 
Attorneys for Plal,nti.ffe and the Class 
I 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
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THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER. 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDJ 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in 
their capacity as member of the Board of 
Director$ of the State Insurance Fund1 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 06-7877 
ORDER DIRECTING THE 
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR 
TO DISTRIBUTE A PORTION OF 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AWARDED BY TIIE COURT 
TIDS MATTER HA VINO COME BEFORE THE COURT pursuant to the 
ORDER DIRECTING THE SET'T'LEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAV OR SECURE PAYMENT 
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE .PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS 
COUNSEL Page 1 
000321 
PAGE 06/07 
APPLICATION OF CLASS COUNSEL FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SETl'LEMENT 
ADMlNISTRATOR TO DISTRtBUTE A PORTION OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED BY THE 
COURTi and the Court having reviewed the same, determined that based upon previous Orders of 
the Court there is no other party or entity with any interest in the Court's determinations with 
respect to the Application and that the requested would be only a partial distribution to one of 
the individuals or entities with any apparent claim to share in the attorney fee awarded by the 
Court and that the all of the interested parties and entities have signed off on the Application, and 
the Court being otherwise fu)Jy advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: That the Settlement Administrator, Oilardi & Co 
shall pay and distribute attorney fees to Gordon Law Offices Chtd, 623 W. Hays ( or such other 
address as it may from time to time specify) in the amount of $342,185.53 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
On this q,,i..day of November, 2010. 
Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
ORDER DIRECTING THJ: SE'ITLEM.lt.NT ADMINlSTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT 
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIO.DJC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATIORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
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THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN,andMARK.SNODGRASSm 
their capacity as member of the Board of 
Directors of the State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 06-7877 
ORDER DIRECTING THE 
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR 
TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT 
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC 
FUTURE PAYMENTS OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS 
COUNSEL. 
THIS MATTER HAVING COME BEFORE THE COURT pursuant to the 
ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT 
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS 
COUNSEL Page I 
000325 ORlCJINAL 
APPLICATION OF CLASS COUNSEL FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT 
ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE 
PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS COUNSEL, and the Court having reviewed the 
same, determined that: 
1. Based upon previous Orders of the Court there is no party or entity other than the firms 
and individuals identified as Class Counsel (terms capitalized herein are intended to have 
the same meaning as ascribed to them in the Stipulation for Settlement filed herein on 
May 10, 2010) with any interest in the Court's determinations with respect to the 
Application. 
2. That all individuals (Donald W. Lojek, Esq., Bruce S. Bistline, Esq.m and Philip Gordon, 
Esa.) and firms (Lojek Law Office, Chtd, and Gordon Law Office, Chtd.) identified as 
Class Counsel have signed the Application 
3. That the requested immediate and periodic future payments can be paid or adequately 
secured without the cost to the Settlement Fund exceeding the sum of 33 1/3% of the 
initial Settlement Fund ($2,300,000) as Ordered by the Court on the22nd day of 
September, 2010. 
Considering this findings and with the Court being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Settlement Administrator, Gilardi & Co shall: 
a. pay and distribute attorney fees to Lojek Law Offices Chtd., at PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 ( or such other address as he may from time to time specify) full 
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payment of its share of fees in this matter as follows; 
1. Immediate Payment in the amount of $106,666.67 
11. Future Periodic Payments as follows: 
(1) Beginning 12/15/2011, Pay $$129,600 Per Year For Five Years 
Certain Only. (5 Payments). 
b. Enter into appropriate non-qualified assignments with entities approved by Lojek 
Law Offices, Chtd., to assure the payment of all future periodic payments, the 
cost of which will not exceed $650,000. 
2. That the Settlement Administrator, Gilardi & Co shall: 
a. pay and distribute attorney fees to Bruce S. Bistline, as an individual Class 
Counsel, full payment of his share of fees in this matter as follows; 
1. Immediate Payment in the amount of $197,217.80 
11. Future Periodic Payments as follows: 
(1) Beginning 12/15/2011, Pay $40,000.00 Per Year For 8 Years 
Certain Only. (8 Payments). 
(2) On 12/15/2019 one payment of $129,000 
(3) On 12/15/2020 one payment of $129,000 
b. Enter into appropriate non-qualified assignments with entities approved by Bruce 
S. Bistline to assure the payment of all future periodic payments, the cost of 
which will not exceed $500,000 .. 
3. That the Settlement Administrator is not to disburse any amounts for the payment of 
attorney fees or to assure the payment of attorney fees which would cause the total 
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amount distributed to exceed $2,300,000. Once the Settlement Administrator has 
disbursed this amount for immediate payments and to enter into non-qualified 
assignments as set forth above, the Settlement Administrator and the Qualified Settlement 
Fund are forever discharged from any duties relative to the payment of attorney fees to 
Donald W. Lojek, Bruce S. Bistline and Lojek Law Offices Chtd., and shall bear no 
liability for the failure of any assignee to make the required future periodic payments in a 
timely manner. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
On this 'l-4'l day of November, 2010. 
Judge Thomas J. Ry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the •"7::l,,, day of November, 2010, I caused to be delivered the 
foregoing document, addressed to the following and delivered by the method indicated below: 
Donald W. Lojek 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 W.Hays 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Gilardi & Co., LLC 
3301 Kerner Blvd. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-













Case No. CV-06-07877*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit as requested in the Notice of Appeal: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
't"', 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this___,~_ day of ~\) 4:- ,. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in an9- }G{ the County of Canyon. 
By: J\ le: Deputy 
- f !' ·~t --~,-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
Case No. CV-06-07877*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 












I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Comt of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby ce1tify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents, except no duplicate 
documents were included from prior appeal No. 35144. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Comt at Caldwell, Idaho this _"----'-_day of __ ,=1':=: ·=, _,. ---'------
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Comt of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
By: 
in andJor the County of Canyon. 
~ · · Deputy 
-- ,fl ;, t~-- -~~- .)•,, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
Supreme Court No. 38140 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 












I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Donald W. Lojek, LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD, 
P.O. Box 1712, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke, HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, PA, P.O. Box 1271, Boise, Idaho 83701 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---L.;""--"- day of __ .... 
1
1·'~\,<-='' ---=C~-___ _, .,,.._~~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and fu.r the County of Canyon. 
By: ' \ Deputy 
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